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A Projection for the Revaluation
of Unfair Competition
ERVIN H. POLLACK*
"The world is still deceiv'd with ornament.
In law, what plea so tainted and corrupt
But, being seasoned with a gracious voice
Obscures the show of evil? In religion,
What damned error but some sober brow
Will bless it and approve it with a text,
Hiding the grossness with fair ornament?
There is no vice so simple but assumes
Some mark of virtue on its outward parts."
Shakespeare, The Merchant of Venice,
Act III, Sc. II.
INTRODUCTION
The rubric of unfair competition is peculiarly American in its
origin and application.1 While the term has not been used generally
by the English courts they have applied its principles under the
heading of "passing off." 2 The American concept of unfair competition
originates from the cases which relate to the appropriation of trade-
marks and trade-names.3 In its early form, the common law doctrine
of unfair competition was limited to "passing off" cases, the practice
of diverting business by falsely representing the articles being sold as
being those of a competitor.4
Unfair competition is an elusive term and does not lend itself
*Associate Professor of Law and Law Librarian, College of Law, The Ohio
State University.
1 PotLocK, LAw OF TORTS 248 (14th ed. 1939).
2 Pollock notes the absence of the term but not of the concept in English law.
POLLOCK, ibid. But cf. Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. KQV Broadcasting Co., 24 F. Supp.
490, 493 (W. D. Pa. 1938) in which the court opines that "the doctrine of unfair
competition is not recognized under the English Common Law."
3 See Handler, Unfair Competition, 21 IA. L. REv. 175, 182 (1936). For other
articles on the historical development of unfair competition see Chafee, Unfair
Competition, 53 -Liv. L. REV. 1289 (1940); Haines, Efforts to Define Unfair Com-
petition, 29 YALE L. J. 1 (1919); Jones, Historical Development of the Law of Bus-
iness Competition, 36 YALE L. J. 42, 207, 351 (1926-1927). See also 1 NIMs, THE
LAw OF UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKs Ch. 1 (4th ed. 1947); DERENBERG,
TRADE-MARK PROTECTION AND UNFAIR TRADING 39ff., 79ff. (1936); 1 CALLMANN, THE
LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS Ch. 2 (2d ed. 1950); HOPKINS, THE
LAW OF TRADEMtARKS, TRADENAMES AND UNFAIR COMPETITON 40a (4th ed. 1924).
4 OPPENtEIM, UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES 44 (1950).
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easily to definition, for, as Professor Handler has observed, the phrase
"embodies a conclusion rather than the means of determining the
legality of business behavior." 5 The conflicting and diffusive economic
philosophies of businessmen, of judges and of legislators have added
to the difficulty of marking out a plane of competition consonant with
qualitative competitive standards.
The elasticity of business morality in the drive for trade has also
had a retarding effect upon the development of superior rivalry
standards. Thus, the precepts formulated by the courts reflect the
various business codes and philosophies, for no unfair or excessive
commercial practice could survive without the support of the majority
of the men active in a trade. This is almost an aphorism since "the
men engaged in business make the rules of the game, legislatures and
courts to the contrary notwithstanding." 6
Early direction for the formulation of legal sanctions was given by
Economist Henry Carter Adams when in 1887 he developed the con-
cept of a legal plane of competition. Adams maintained that when the
majority of competitors were in accord as to a business procedure and
a minority of their group refused to abide by the practice, the law
should give support and sanction to the majority. Thus, he contended,
a legal plane of competition, higher than can be developed in the
absence of legal force, would evolve. 7
In this manner the courts expanded the concept of unfair com-
petition to narrow the gap between the law and the public conscience.
However, the courts have not followed any rigid or inflexible doctrines
as to when they should interfere to prevent unfair business methods.
Each case is considered in the light of its particular facts,s the courts
being guided in each instance by what has been been called "the
principles of old-fashioned honesty."9 Quite naturally, such vague,
general notions bred disparities, inconsistencies and conflicts in the
law, a weakness not denied by the courts.' 0 Yet, any other approach,
5 Handler, op. cit. note 3, at 175.
6 Williams, The Federal Trade Commission Law, 63 ANNALS 3 (1916).
Mr. Justice Douglas recently gave further implementation to this thought when
he said: "Law provides many sanctions against conduct which society condemns. But
law is not and never can be the repository of our entire moral code. It deals only
with the more extreme and more severe instances of immorality." Douglas, Honesty
in Government, 4 OFLA. L. Rlv. 279, 280 (1951).
7 Adams, Relation of the State to Industrial Action, I PuBLiCATOmNS OF THE
AmuucAN EcON. AssN. No. 6, 43-44, 46-47 (1887), as cited by Oppenheim, op. cit.
note 4, at 2.
8 Jewel Tea Co. v. Kraus, 187 F. 2d 278, 282, 88 U.S.P.Q. 14, 16 (7th Cir. 1950).
9 Ibid.
10 Id. at 15. In Premier-Pabst Corp. v. Elm City Brewing Co., 9 F. Supp. 754,
760, 23 U.S.P.Q. 84, 89 (D. Conn. 1934) this criticism was expressed as follows: "It has
been stated by eminent authority that in cases of unfair competition, such conduct
is wrongful as 'shocks the judicial sensibilities.' This, however, is observation upon
[Vol. 13
UNFAIR COMPETITION
it was feared, would have produced a rigid, mechanical jurisprudence
which might have had a seriously deterring effect upon American
commercial activity and our economic progress.
Nevertheless, in the numerous court decisions rendered during the
past two hundred years which affect American business practices,
certain general principles have been formulated. These concepts, a
few of which are summarized below, embody the various philosophies
for preventing trade abuses.
The underlying, early doctrine, that it is wrong for a businessman
fraudulently to sell his goods as and for those of a competitor, was
applied in cases involving misrepresentation by word ("passing off")
or by conduct (wrongful appropriation of trade-marks). 1 ' This
doctrine has been extended to the copying of labels, packages, color,
wrappers, dress, form and appearance of goods. Therefore, "unfair
competition in trade is not confined to the imitation of a trade-mark,
but takes as many forms as the ingenuity of man can devise."'
2
Inevitably, the courts were compelled to extend the doctrine to
include other competitive practices which were designed to injure a
rival's business. As one court clearly summarized the problem, " ...
in the march of commerce, skulduggery seems to have kept abreast of
science in inventiveness, so that new and more subtle means were found
to violate the right of identity by introducing confusion into the
public mind; much as sly innuendoes were substituted for cruder
words wherewith to sap and destroy reputations. On the whole these
subtleties have found small favor with the courts ....
The unfair methods were extended to include interference with
contractual relations; disparagement of product, title and business
practices of another; the use of illegal methods to attract customers;
intimidation, coercion and molestation of competitor's customers;
and the appropriation of values created by another.14
Tim OBJECTIVES OF TnE LAW OF UNFAIR COmPETrrION
The legal foundation of unfair competition is judicial in origin.
The courts have developed the concept within the frame-work of equity
to prevent enrichment at the expense of what another has created.15
the law, and not a statement of the law itself. For the law is said to be a rule of
human conduct, and surely the honest but perplexed man of business (like the nisi
prius judge) can derive little practical guidance from such an observation."
11 Premier-Pabst Corp. v. Elm City Brewing Co., ibid.
12 Manitowoc Malting Co. v. Milvaukee Malting Co., 119 Wisc. 543, 546, 97
N.W. 389, 390 (1903).
13 Premier-Pabst Corp. v. Elm City Brewing Co., op. cit. note 10, at 759.
14 The articles and treatises listed in note 3 document these propositions.
15 Sunbeam Corp. v. Sunbeam Furniture Co., 88 F. Supp. 852, 85 U.S.P,Q, 58
(S. D. Cal. 1950).
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However, there is no universally accepted rationale to form the basis
for the relief provided by the law. Its objectives, which have been
separately and collectively recognized by the courts, are threefold.16
It seeks (1) to protect the honest businessman in the trade to which he
is fairly entitled; 17 (2) to punish the dishonest trader who attempts to
take away his competitor's business by unfair means;'5 and (8) to pro-
tect the public from deception and unfair business practices.' 9
Professor Handler has carefully noted that jurists are in disagree-
ment as to the basis for this relief.20 Some courts have theorized that
its objective is the protection of property - custom or good-will. Others
have supported the view that the economic well-being of consumers is
the ultimate goal of commercial activity.2 ' The courts give only passing
reference to the punishment theory.
Judge Frank has observed that the bases of the judicial acceptance
of these concepts reflect, in a measure, the economic theories of the
times.22 It would seem that intervention in unfair competition cases
was first allowed to eliminate the adverse effect of unfair business
practices on competitors. In the initial application of the doctrine of
unfair competition, little attention was given to the interests of the
consumers.
The appropriation of trade-names developed into a fairly com-
mon type of unfair competition with almost complete attention given
by the courts to competitors' injuries. With the judicial interest
focused upon the plight of the tradesman, it became increasingly ap-
parent that the adverse effect of these business activities on the con-
sumer was being neglected. Therefore, "before long the neglect of the
consumer in trade-name cases aroused the judicial conscience." 23
Judicial awareness of the problem was observed in decisions,
16 Smith, Kline and French Laboratories v. Clark and Clark, 62 F. Supp. 971,
66 US.P.Q. 440 (D.N.J. 1945); Mark Realty Corp, v, Major Amusement Co., 180
App. Div. 549, 168 N.Y. Supp. 244 (1917).
17 Ibid.
Is Ibid.
19 Stably, Inc. v. M. H. Jacobs Co., Inc., 183 F. 2d 914, 86 U.S.P.Q. 131 (7th
Cir. 1950); K. Taylor Distilling Co. v. Food Center of St. Louis, Inc., 31 F. Supp.
460, 45 U.S.P.Q. 120 (E.D. Mo. 1940); Standard Brands v, Smidler, 171 F. 2d 34
(2d Cir. 1945).
20 Handler, op. cit. note 3, at 183.
21 Standard Brands v. Smidler, supra note 19.
22 Ibid.
23 Id. at 40. Judge Frank illustrates the point by reference to Adam Smith's
opposition to the "mercantile system." Smith argued that the "mercantile system"
constantly sacrificed consumer interest to that of the producer; thus, under this
program the ultimate objective of commercial activity was production. Smith dis-
approved of the system, holding that consumption was the ultimate end and ob-
jective of production; therefore, producer interest was significant only as a necessary
means to give support to consumer requirements.
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which, as apparent after-thoughts, declared that the object of injunctive
relief was to protect the purchasers from deception. The deception
was deemed to be economically injurious to the customers. Judge Frank
has stated that "for years the courts, when granting such protection,
justified their decisions on the ostensible but unverified ground that
the customers were being guarded against financial harm."24 If the
buyers had sued, Frank contended, the courts unquestionably would
have required that they prove the economic loss since in an action for
deceit a financial loss must be shown.
While it is correct that an action at law cannot be maintained for
fraud unless accompanied by damage, 25 this principle is not necessarily
applicable in equity. To illustrate, in order to defeat a suit for specific
performance of a contract to convey land, upon the ground of fraud,
the misrepresentation need not result in damage either to the vendor
or third persons. Thus, equity will not enforce a contract regardless
of damage if the misrepresentation was intentional, was made to de-
ceive the vendor and the vendor relying upon misrepresentation was
deceived by it.26
This principle was followed where A obtained by fraud a contract
from B to convey land on which C had required rights by working and
making improvements. The injury to the third person was deemed
sufficient to bar specific performance of the contract.2 7
These circumstances are comparable to trade-name situations
where injunctive relief is founded upon consumer deception. In neither
case does equity require proof of damages to a third person as an
essential element before it will intervene.
While Judge Frank's conclusions as to proof of damages may be
questioned, his criticism of the judicial rule that relief is granted in
trade-name cases solely upon the ground that customers are being
protected from financial harm has substantial merit. To illustrate his
point, Judge Frank describes a situation where the trade-name of a
soap is imitated. The soaps are identical but the imitator sells his
product at a lower price. If the sole object were to protect the public
from economic harm, the imitator would then have a complete defense
upon a showing that he sold his identical soap at a lower price. Where-
in, therefore, is there a financial loss which will support the action?
The quarrel here is not with the result - that the imitator should
be prohibited from deceiving the public - but with the rationale of
the courts - that the imitator should be enjoined because of the
financial harm caused consumers.
If the courts limited the objectives in the trade-name cases to the
24 Ibid.
25 Morrison v. Lods, 39 Cal. 381 (1870).
26 Kelly v. Central Padfic R. Co., 74 Cal. 557, 16 Pac. 386 (1888).
27 Ibid.
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general proposition that injunctive relief should be granted to protect
the public from deception, their position would be supportable. But
they are not content to stop here. It appears that in the early develop-
ment of the doctrine imitators, in some instances, incidentally produced
inferior products with resulting financial loss to the public. In those
cases, the courts modified the rule to state that the second user should
not be permitted to deceive the public because of the resulting financial
harm to them. There, deception of the public was not permitted to
stand independently as a basis for relief. The former proposition then
in all likelihood was taken over by the courts to cover all trade-name
cases irrespective of the circumstances creating financial harm to the
consumer. Hence, the principle was repeatedly invoked by the courts
without identifying and verifying the economic loss. The result has
been that both rules, as applied by the courts, have been given the
same meaning.
Judge Frank's criticism, it appears, would have more force if it
were argued that while in equity deception of the public is a ground
for interference in trade-name cases, the courts should not encumber
the rule by unsupported verbal surplusage as to financial harm to the
public since situations occur where the rule is applied when economic
harm is non-existent.
For the most part, however, judicial action is based upon the
concurrent considerations of injury to a competitor and probable
deception of the public.2 8 But this dual concept is of little practical
significance since, in each case, relief is granted by applying the
doctrine of secondary meaning.
Where a businessman passes off his goods or services as those of a
complainant by imitating a trade-name, a term or the physical features
first used by the complainant in association with his article, services or
business, injunctive aid is contingent upon proving that the copied
name, term or features acquired a secondary meaning. Secondary
meaning is the association of the name, term or features of the article
in the public's mind with the first comer as the source of the product
in such a manner that the acts of imitation by the second comer in all
likelihood creates confusion as to its source. 29
In secondary meaning cases, deception of the public is an essential
factor for the granting of relief. It is of little consequence, therefore,
that the protection of the competitor principle be affirmatively stated
since it is implicit in the deception theory. However, it is conceivable
that one might give different interpretations to the phrases "confusion
of the public" in secondary meaning cases and "deception of the
28 Handler, op. cit. note 3, at 183.
29 American Fork and Hoe Co. v. Stampit Corp., 125 F. 2d 472 (6th Cir. 1942);
Nu Enamel Corp. v. Nate-Enamel Co., 151 Misc. 405, 271 N.Y. Supp. 656 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1934); Sinko v. Snow-Craggs Corp., 105 F. 2d 450 (7th Cir. 1939).
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public" when used broadly, but such distinction has not been made
by the courts nor does it appear significant.
The conflicting explanations as to the effects of unfair trade
practices on competitive activities illustrate further this lack of court
agreement. Some courts have stated that the purpose of the law is not
only to further competition but to destroy monopoly.3 0 Others have
taken the narrower view that it aims to foster competition, avoiding
any affirmative claim as to its effect on monopoly.3 1 The third view is
that the legal protection afforded by unfair competition doctrines, such
as in trade-name cases, does not further competition; in fact, it is
restrictive in its effect, resulting in lawful monopolies.3 2
However, all are in agreement with the fundamental principle
that competition in trade is universal, entirely proper and in the
public interest. Therefore, a businessman has the right to enter an
established field no matter what its effect on competitors.33 As Mr.
30 Western Auto Supply Co. v. Knox, 33 U.S.P.Q. 65 (W.D. Okla, 1937),
reversed in 93 F. 2d 850, 36 U.S.P.Q. 168 (10th Cir. 1937).
31 Baltimore Bedding Corp. v. Moses, 182 Md. 229, 34 A. 2d 338, 59 U.S.P.Q.
405 (Md. CA. 1943).
32 This view is very effectively presented by Judge Frank in Eastern Wine Corp.
v. Winslow-Warren, Ltd., Inc., 137 F. 2d 955, 957, 57 U.S.P.Q. 433, 435 (2d Cir.
1943) and in Standard Brands v. Smidler, op. cit. note 19, at 42.
33 In New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262 (1932), the United States
Supreme Court held an Oklahoma statute to be repugnant to the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. The Act declared the
manufacture, sale and distribution of ice to be a public business and forbad anyone
from engaging in it without first procuring a license from a state commission. The
statute also provided that no license was to issue without proof of necessity for the
manufacture, sale or distribution of ice in the area to which the application applied
and if the facilities already existing and licensed at that place were sufficient to
meet the public requirements thereto, the commission could deny the application.
This state experiment, initiated during an economic depression, restricted the right
to engage in a lawful private business and was held to be a denial of due process. Mr.
Justice Sutherland, in the opinion of the Court, stated that nothing was more clearly
settled than the proposition (quoting from Burns Baking Co. v. Byran, 264 U.S. 504,
513 (1924)) that it is beyond the power of the state "under the guise of protecting
the public, arbitrarily [to] interfere with private business or prohibit lawful oc-
cupations or impose unreasonable and unnecessary restrictions upon them." From
Mr. Justice Brandeis' dissent in the New State Ice Co. case one reaches the conclusion
that perhaps the principle is not as clearly settled as Mr. Justice Sutherland believed.
Mr. Justice Brandeis cautioned the Supreme Court that while it had the power to
strike down the experimental statute, the Court should constantly be on its guard
lest it crystallize its prejudices into legal principles. So he stated, "Denial of the right
to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to the Nation. It is one of
the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory, and try novel social and economic experiments
without risk to the rest of the country." Should we again be fraught with serious
economic problems, it is not clearly settled what the Court would do if confronted by
further state "experimentation." See Mr. Justice Holmes' dissent in Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905), in which he contended that " ... a constitution is not
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Justice Holmes clearly demonstrated, "a man has the right to set up a
shop in a small village which can support but one of the kind, although
he expects and intends to ruin a deserving widow who is established
there already."3 4 This principle of free competition remains undis-
turbed notwithstanding the temporal injury or the damage of inter-
ference with the deserving widow's business "when the damage is done
not for its own sake, but as an instrumentality in reaching the end of
victory in the battle of trade." 35
Nor will the courts enjoin the use of business methods which
another has conceived and found profitable. To hold otherwise would
result in the fostering of monopolies and the stifling of competition. 36
Also, the sharing of the good will of an article created by the ingenuity
and judgment of another businessman, the demand for which has been
effectively supplied by extensive and consistent advertising, is not, of
itself, unfair.3 T
This thesis was clearly expressed by Judge Yankwich when he
stated that "under the guise of unfair competition, we should not
grant to a person a perpetual monopoly which, for lack of invention, he
is denied under patent law for a limited time. (The principle applies
equally to trade-mark matters - Ed.) Unless the imitation is of
structure, form, material and the like, and is so slavish as to tend
inevitably to deceive the buyer . we should not allow ... [it] to
become a monopoly."3 8
Economist Hemy Garter Adams was of the opinion that the law
of unfair competition does not curtail competitive action, being merely
a determination of the manner in which it may lawfully take place.3 9
This appears to be the more supportable position since this doctrine
does not prohibit one from engaging in legitimate private business
activity. The choice of and participation in a business venture is not
subject to legal control. Restraint relates to the conduct or procedure
intended to embody a particular economic theory, whether of paternalism and the
organic relation of the citizen to the State or of laissez-faire. It is made for people of
fundamentally differing views, and the accident of our finding certain opinions
natural and familiar or novel and even shocking ought not to conclude our judg-
ment upon the question whether statutes embodying them conflict with the Con-
stitution of the United States."
34 Holmes, Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8 HARv. L. REv. 1, 3 (1894).
35 Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 106, 44 N.E. 1077, 1081 (1896).
36 Kaiser & Blair, Inc. v. Merchants Assn., Inc., 64 F. 2d 575, 576, 17 U.S.P.Q.
357, 359 (6th Cir. 1933).
ST Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co, 305 U.S. 111 (1938); Coca-Cola Co. v.
Nehi Corp., 36 A. 2d 156, 60 U.S.P.Q. 345 (Dela. Sup. Ct. 1944),
38 Joyce, Inc. v. Fern Shoe Co., 32 F. Supp. 401, 405, 45 U.S.P.Q. 243, 247
(S.D. Cal. 1940).
39 Adams, Relation of the State to Industrial Action, 1 PuB. oF THE Am. EcoN.
ASSN. 43 (No. 6, 1887).
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of doing business. The objective is not to restrict quantitatively or
competitively those who may engage in a business pursuit but to re-
strain all comers from such business conduct as is deemed to be unfair.
Since some business activities are based solely on the imitation of
financially successful and accepted trade-names and products, pro-
hibitions as to the copying of established names or significant com-
modity features frequently result in a reduction in the number of
participants in business ventures. Whether such limited restrictions
constitute legal monopolistic practices depends essentially on the
meaning given to the word "monoply." Differences of opinion exist as
to whether proscription of these unfair trade practices is "monopolistic"
in character. However, it is not the purpose here to dwell at length on
a related problem in semantics. More significant, for present con-
sideration, are the differences of opinion which exist regarding the
meaning and objectives of unfair trade practices. These conflicts and
distinctions, as they relate both to the extension of doctrines and to
the application of established principles, reveal the need for a thorough
revaluation of the basic concepts of trade practices and refinement
of judicial case treatment.4 0
THEORIES OF LIABILrry - NOmINATE AND PRIrMA FACIE TORTS
Differences exist not only within the frame-work of unfair com-
petition but also as between the theories of tort liability. The two basic
theories of liability are: (1) The nominate torts and (2) the prima
facie torts, the former being the more generally accepted doctrine.4 1
The nominate torts theory holds that all actionable wrongs must
be brought under a specific tort which is judicially recognizable, such
as negligence, deceit, malicious prosecution, etc. While under the
early common law there was no tort called "unfair competition,"
certain unfair trade practices were categorized under other recognized
torts. Eventually, these practices, developing from the conventional
40 More than ten years ago Professor Chafee expressed the opinion that the
time was "ripe to extend unfair competition over all it popularly means, namely,
every unfairness by a competitor." Chafee, op. cit. note 3, at 1302.
Judge Frank, while not offering a theory of liability for unfair trade practices,
suggested "that the judge-made trade name doctrines . . . be re-evaluated in the
light of competent research showing their practical social consequences on con-
sumers, and that, until then, the courts should not extend those doctrines to foster
expanded trade-name monopolies." General Time Instrument Corp. v. United
States Time Corp., 165 F. 2d 853, 855 (2d Cir. 1948).
41 Professor Oppenheim in his UNFAm TRADE PRAaCnCEs Ch. 1 (1950) gives an
excellent account of the various theories of tort liability. In summarizing these
theories the writer leaned heavily upon Professor Oppenheim's survey.
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torts, took on individual characteristics. 42
The prima facie tort theory has received much attention in
America since its introduction by Holmes and Wigmore. 43 The essence
of the doctrine is given in a series of questions by Professor Oppen-
heim: (1) Has a legal harm been suffered by the plaintiff? (2) Was the
defendant responsible for the harm? and (3) Can the harm be justified?
Is it privileged?44
Mr. Justice Holmes, in the famous decision of Aikens v. Wis-
consin,45 defined the principle in the oft-quoted statement:
"It has been considered that, prima facie, the intentional infliction
of temporal damages is a cause of action, which as a matter of sub-
stantive law, whatever may be the form of pleading, requires a justi-
fication if the defendant is to escape."
The prima facie tort theory operates from the basic premise that
all intentional, unjustifiable harm to business is tortious; thus, under
42 Sir John Salmond was a leading advocate of the nominate torts doctrine.
He opined that there was no English law of tort, only on English law of torts, "that
is, a list of acts and omissions which, in certain conditions, were actionable."
SALMOND, LAw OF ToRTs 15 (10th ed. 1945). Salmond contended, therefore, that a
plaintiff must bring his cause of action under a recognized tort. Professor Winfield
did not agree with this view. He argued that novelty itself is not a conclusive ob-
jection to a cause of action, admitting, however, that the novelty of the suit may
raise a presumption against it. Winfield, The Foundation of Liability in Tort, 27
COL. L. REv. 1 (1927). Sir Frederick Pollock held an opinion contrary to Salmond's,
supporting the prima fade torts theory. Hence, his view of the law of torts extended
beyond the range of a number of recognized, rigid rules. See Pollock, Preface . ..
in THE LAW OF TORTS VI (1887), in which he stated " . . . the purpose of this
book is to show that there really is a Law of Torts, not merely a number of rules of
law about various kinds of torts - that this is a true living branch of the Common
Law, not a collection of heterogeneous instances." Note the different meanings
Salmond and Pollock gave to the word "torts."
43 Holmes, Privilege, Malice and Intent, 8 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1894); Wigmore,
The Tripartite Division of Torts, 8 HARv. L. REv. 200 (1894).
This theory has its origin in early English court dicta. As early as 1760, Lord
Mansfield referred to "the action upon the case" (the forerunner of several modem
torts) as a "liberal action." Gardiner v. Croasdale, 2 Burx. 905, 906; Moses v.
Macferlan, 2 Burr. 1005, 1011-1012. Chief Justice Pratt in 1762 said, "Torts are
infinitely various, not limited or confined." Chapman v. Pickersgill, 2 Wils. 145,
146. See the discussion in WINFIELD, Tim LAw OF TORTS 14 (3d ed. 1946). Deeper
doctrinal roots were planted in the English cases of Keeble v. Hickeringill, 11 East
574 note (Tr. 5 Ann.). The House of Lords Trilogy (Mogul Steamship Co., Ltd. v.
McGregor, Gow & Co., 23 Q.B.D. 589 (1889), affirmed (1892) A.C. 25; Allen v. Flood
(1898) A.C. 1; and Quinn v. Leatham (1901) A.C. 495); and Templeton v. Russell
(1893) 1 Q.B. 715. Lord Justice Bowen in Skinner & Co. v. Shew & Co. (1893) 1 Ch.
413, 422, gave recognition to the doctrine. He said, "At Common Law there was a
cause of action whenever one person did damage to another wilfully and intention-
ally and without just cause or excuse."
44 Oppenheim, op. cit. note 4, at 47.
45 195 U.S. 194, 204 (1904).
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this doctrine, additional torts may be formulated by the courts to meet
new conditions in a changing competitive society. The central issue,
in each case, is the nature and scope of the justified or privileged
conduct.
While this doctrine has not been followed by the majority of the
American courts, its influence has recently spread to include the New
York Court of Appeals.4 6 The majority, however, provide relief against
unfair business practices by reliance upon the nominate torts, the con-
duct being condemned under various names.
However, in their consideration of trade activities, the American
courts have not adhered strictly to the orthodox nominate torts. As
Professor Oppenheim observed, "In thus building up a list of recog-
nized business wrongs, the courts have actually extended the area of
relief against unfair trade practices without necessarily so denominating
them. The least that can be said is that under the modern common
law the American courts manifested a restlessness in being hemmed in
by the walls of the nominate torts and began to build a bridge from
the specific torts to the broader outlook of the prima facie theory. The
fact that the courts in this country did not occupy the whole area on
the other side of the bridge does not nullify the significance of the con-
necting link."47
In going beyond the orthodox nominate tort rules to extend the
bases for relief in trade practice cases, the courts have applied principles
which are difficult to delineate and identify. The shibboleth of nom-
inate commercial torts has undergone considerable change by the
judicial extension and modification of the definitions and meanings
of old terms and doctrines.48 To meet the changing therapeutic needs
46 Advance Music Corp. v. American Tobacco Co., 296 N.Y. 79, 70 N.E. 2d 401
(1946) invoked the prima facie tort theory. In that case a publisher of musical
compositions complained that the defendant in a weekly radio "hit song" program
presented the nine or ten most popular songs of the week which were selected with
caprice, did not reflect an accurate survey of the national or relative order of
popularity of the songs and were made with intent to injure the plaintiff in the
sale of its songs.
47 Oppenheim, op. cit. note 4, at 48.
Professor Winfield in the earlier period of his career supported the prima fade
tort theory but later changed his position, contending that the nominate tort
doctrine is "suffice" although the other concept is "valid." His change of mind was
founded on the creation by the courts of new nominate torts. He saw in these
new rules the acceptance and extension of the principle that all unjustifiable harm
is tortious. He, therefore, concluded that tort law is "steadily expanding and . ..
[that] the idea of its being cribbed, cabined and confined in a set of pigeonholes is
untenable." UINFIEuD, TiE LAw oF TORT 15 (3d ed. 1946).
48 Dean Pound has described law as " . . . a highly complex aggregate,
arising social from the attempt of men in politically organized society to satisfy the
claims involved in civilized social life so far as they may be satisfied by a systematic
ordering of conduct and adjustment of relations. Looking at law this way we
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of an active, aggressive economy without revealing changes in the
social prescriptions, the containers bearing the old labels were filled
with new elixirs by the judicial pharmacists. The failure to identify
the new compounds by different names has created doctrinal con-
fusion and uncertainties. This reflects, in a measure, the not uncommon
current practice of compounding judicial prescriptions intuitively
where the results substantially depend upon the economic predilections
and subjective evaluations of the jural pharmacists.
Abstract verbalism in relation to unfair trade practices has been
fraught with overlappings and inconsistencies. This is not novel in
the law, for the resulting conflicts inevitably arise in the absence of
clear systematization and uniform classification. It does not follow,
however, that disingenuous formulation of general principles will
secure a pattern of uniformity and consistency in the law. As some
students have observed, the administration of justice is not controlled
by general principles. 49 In fact, legal history has taught us "that rules
and principles are empty symbols which take on significance only to
the extent they are informed with the social and professional traditions
of a particular time and place.... It is not the symbols but the habits
of thought that control interpretation and decision."50
In this connection, the judicial process followed in formulating
and rendering decisions has special significance.5 ' Dean Pound has
directed attention to the "intuitive" process used by the courts in ap-
plying abstract concepts to the facts in specific cases. Where standards
are applied intuitively by the courts when varying circumstances must
be kept in mind, Dean Pound concludes that there must be reliance
upon "the trained common sense of the expert as to uncommon
things." 52 Such common sense cannot be formalized into a syllogistic
perceive at once how change takes place continually without our being aware of it
•.. Because names and forms remain the same it does not follow that the content
of the law is constant. Modification of the current ideal picture of the social order
by which judges are governed in choosing analogies, in developing principles, and
in applying rules, may change the law in action profoundly within a generation
while the outward forms remain the same." Pound, The Theory of Judicial De-
cision, 36 H.uzv. L. Rav. 641, 660 (1923).
49 Yntema. The Hornbook Method and the Conflict of Laws, 37 HASv. L. REv.
468, 479-480 (1928); FRANK, LAw AND TIE MODERN MIND 157 (1930).
50 Yntema, ibid.
51 Examples of such writings are: CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS (1921); LEvi, AN INTRODUCrON TO LEGAL REASONING (1949); Frank, Cardozo
and the Upper Court Myth, 13 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 369 (1948); FRANK, LAw
AND THE MODERN MIND (1930); FRANK, CoUwrs ON TRIAL (1949); Cohen, F. S.,
Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COL. L. Rzv. 809 (1935);
Hutchison, Judgement Intuitive - Function of the "Hunch" in Judicial Decisions,
14 CORN. L. Q. 274 (1929); Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence - The Next Step,
30 COL. L. Rxv. 431 (1930); COHEN, M. R., LAW AND THE SOCIAL OREnR (1933).
52 Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision 111, 36 HA~v. L. REv. 940, 952
(1923).
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premise. "Where the call is for individuality in the product of the
legal mill ... we resort to standards and to intuitive application." He
thinks, however, that resulting uncertainties are more theoretical than
actual, since the instinct of the trained person functions with assurance.
"Innumerable details and minute discriminations have entered into it
and it has been gained by long experience which has made the proper
inclusions and exclusions by trial and error until the effective line of
action has become a habit."
Yet, any survey of the law of unfair competition creates a doubt
as to the correctness of this conclusion, since inconsistencies and in-
definiteness are not uncommon findings, revealing a wider range for
vagaries in the operation of the intuitive process than is admitted or
recognized.
Professor Yntema is of the opinion that a decision is reached by a
judge "after an emotive experience in which principles and logic play
a secondary role. The function of juristic logic and the principles
which it employs seems to be like that of language, to describe the
event which has already transpired."53 General principles are in-
capable of controlling decisional results. Indefinite as to meaning, they
are suggestive of individual interpretations founded upon subjective
experience. And because of this indefiniteness they offer little di-
rectional guidance in the organization of that experience or in cor-
relating it to other experiences and conditions.
Applying Professor Yntema's theory to the law of unfair com-
petition, the significant issue, since the law is general in substance, is
not the formulation of the principle but the determination of the
cases and the extent to which it is applicable. Professor Yntema
reasoned that the general principle cannot control "because it does not
inform."54 What is needed, however, is not blind devotion to the facts
in trade cases, but a reconsideration of their principles to give the
concepts more meaning and definiteness. Otherwise, the law becomes
a game with the results hinging, to a substantial extent, on the skills
and adroitness of the attorneys rather than on principles of justice.
Another basis for the difficulty in exploring the judicial process
is in the determination of the facts which the judge considers con-
trolling in a case.5 5 When the facts are few in number, the salient
factors can be easily ascertained. The problem of identification of the
controlling facts develops, however, when the factors are numerous
and diversified and it is uncertain which were considered pertinent by
the judge in his deliberation. Since those factors are so significant in
unfair competition holdings, each case may assume features of varying
distinctiveness so that the relationship between similar situations be-
13 Yntena, op. cit. note 49, at 480.
54 Ibid.
55 FaANK, LAW AND THE MODERN Mn~rD 151 (1930).
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comes uncertain and speculative. Therefore, the application of a
general principle to complex, though similar circumstances, may
result in varying conclusions, offering little by way of predictability
or certainty of the law.
OTmER THEORIES OF LL4ABiLrry
Other theories of liability, which enlarge upon the restrictive
nominate tort principles, have been developed by legal writers.5 6
While the scope of the protection of honest trade activity is broadened
by them, narrowing the gap between legal and moral principles, none
as yet has been given judicial endorsement. Nevertheless, any dis-
cussion of the theories of liability would be incomplete in the absence
of a treatment of these serious and significant contributions.
Professor Grismore called for a recognition that a time is reached
in the competitive business struggle, short of acquiring the trade,
when the competitors gain a right to it so that the other traders should
not be permitted by continuing the quest for that business to invade the
right, except when the conduct is privileged as being fair competition. 57
He showed dissatisfaction with the American courts, unwillingness to
adopt the prima facie tort theory's wider range of business protection
and argued that in the absence of such policy our commercial life will
be a mad scramble. He claimed, further, that the point of interference
is reached when it seems that a customer would engage in business
with the plaintiff were it not for the activity of the plaintiff's competitor
in attracting the trade away from the plaintiff. Thus, if a trader can
show with reasonable certainty that his competitor's conduct was
responsible for his loss of business, a cause of action exists, unless the
competitor can justify his activity as being fair.
Professor Leon Green formalized a segment of tort law to include
"hurts done to commercial relational interests by third persons." 58
He evolved a variegated classification of relational interests, extending
them beyond symbolized, tangible objects to include intangible forces.
He observed that injury to relational interests involve three parties:
a plaintiff, a defendant and a third person. A relationship exists be-
tween the plaintiff and a third person which is harmed by the
defendant. He conceives of this to be "a hurt done to a relational
56 For a comprehensive summary of these additional theories, see Oppenheim,
op. cit. note 4, at 59.
57 Grismore, Are Unfair Methods of Competition Actionable at the Suit of a
Competitor? 33 MIcH. L. Rxv. 821 (1935).
58 Green, Relational Interests, 29 ILL. L. REv. 460, 1041 (1934-1935); 30 Iu. L.
Rav. 1 (1935).
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interest." Such interests are classified by him as family, trade, pro-
fessional, general social and political.
Professor Chafee classifies the diversified commercial activities
into three categories: The policy of Conservatism, the policy of Con-
quest and the policy of Exploration. "Conservatism" covers the
standard forms of "passing off." "Conquest" extends unfair competition
to cover all unfair competitive practices. These extensions of the
doctrine are represented in the prima facie tort theory, statutory
control of competition and the inclusion of misappropriation as a
segment of unfair competition. 59 Chafee concludes that the policy
of "Conquest" has been restricted by court interpretation, offering no
satisfactory solution to the many problems of unfair trade practices.
He recommends, in lieu of either "Conservatism" or "Conquest," the
application of his policy of "Exploration." This would permit a
cautious extension of doctrinal concepts to include new types of
standardized wrongs. In this manner, specific practices could be con-
sidered separately, omitting the wide range of the prima facie tort
theory where a practice is presumed tortious unless justified. He
cautions against the application of new principles to frequently re-
curring harms.
To follow a different policy, in Chafee's opinion, would eventually
lead to the court's assuming the task of business management. Finally,
he considers the following social factors which influence judicial
determination of trade practice cases: (1) The protection should be
definable; (2) monopolies are deemed to be against the public interest;
(3) the practice is to centralize the protection of morality in the
government; and (4) certain trade practices are controlled more
effectively by administrative bodies than courts.6 0
Rudolph Callman has developed a theory of unfair competition
for American courts, founded on civil law doctrine, with the view to
formulate basic concepts of general applicability. The judicial ap-
plication of this concept would broaden the range of current case by
case treatment. Essentially, Callmann views business competition as
"A peculiar order of struggle as distinguished from an order of peace."
Peace and harmony have been marked out for large areas of the law;
however, in Callmann's opinion, competitive relationship is not
among them, since it is the basis for the struggle and conflict between
business rivals for trade. He claims that it is part of the order of
struggle which permits a competitor to injure the trade of his rivals.
He concludes that the law should regulate this struggle for business,
defining fair competitive practices as "struggle according to game-
like rules by means of constructive effort subject to the natural con-
ditions of the market." Unfair competition would constitute the
59 International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
60 Chafee, Unfair Competition, 53 Hsv. L. REv. 1289 (1940).
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violation of these rules, but the unfair practice would originate
directly from the "struggle order" rather than as a by-product of a
conventional tort concept of the "peace order." In this manner, Call-
mann's "struggle" theory provides a foundation for liability apart
from the prima facie tort theory. Thus, instead of treating competition
as a privilege or justification for competitive harm, the injury is re-
garded as prima facie in accord with the "order of struggle." 6 1
In Professor Handler's opinion, the common law has provided
protection against only extreme competitive excesses, leaving business
exposed to a wide range of abuses which the courts could restrain.
Therefore, he observes, the judicial control of unfair competition is
deficient and haphazard.
He finds, also, that the statutory contribution to unfair competi-
tion is limited since many of the statutes are so general in language
as to fail to establish a plane of competition. This responsibility is
passed on to the courts and administrative agencies. It is his view that
these short-comings could best be met by a uniform statute enacted
by Congress and the states relating to common law trade practices
and the significant functions condemned by the Federal Trade Com-
mission and the pertinent legislative restrictions. This uniform act
would contain the basic elements of a law of unfair competition with
changes and additions provided by administrative legislation. He
favors administrative regulation, covering segments of industrial
activity, to the less effective case by case, decisional control. Handler
concludes that "A careful legislative and administrative definition of
unfair competition, plus the net-work of judicial and administrative
sanctions and public and private remedies, would go far in elevating
our business standards and in facilitating competition."' 62
The Restatement of Torts, by giving independent consideration
to specific unfair trade practices, avoids the sweeping effect of the
prima facie tort theory. Professor Chafee considers the Restatement
and his Exploration policy to be substantially the same since each
allows for the gradual expansion of unfair competition to include new
types of injuries. Professor Oppenheim, while in accord with Chafee's
conception of the Restatement's methodology, takes issue with his
views regarding the coverage of the Restatement. The inter-relation
between the liability based upon nominate torts and the general
principles of prima facie torts in the Restatement is demonstrated by
reference to the Restatement commentary on Section 766. The re-
statement recognizes "a general duty not to interfere purposely with
another's reasonable expectancies of trade with third persons, whether
or not the expectancies are secured by contract, unless the interference
61 Callmann, What is Unfair Competition? 28 GEo. L. J. 585 (1940); 1 Call-
mann, supra, note 3.
62 Handler, Unfair Competition, op. cit. note 3, at 262.
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is privileged under the circumstances." This section, Professor Op-
penheim opines, follows the prima facie tort theory, the difference
being as between situations which give rise to a justification or privi-
lege.03 The Restatement particularizes the types of injuries and does
not accept, exclusive of nominate torts, the broad, general Holmes-
Wigmore thesis that any competitive activity is prima facie tortious
necessitating justification. However, there is merit to the contention
that the Restatement provides an inter-relation of the liability founded
upon nominate torts and the basic concept of prima facie torts.
CONCEPTUAL CONFLICTS
It is almost axiomatic to say that certain basic principles in unfair
competition are uncontrolling because they are uninforming. While
any attempt to reduce the fundamental concepts of unfair trade
practices to mathematical certainty would be grasping the shadow for
the substance, a revaluation of the principles to satisfy our social
requirements would do much to reduce the uncertainty and confusion
which currently characterizes the field. By eliminating any plan for
absolute legal certainty "we may augment markedly the amount of
actual legal certainty." 64 Yet, any study of our trade practices must
invariably be subject to the imperfections of our knowledge of the
social sciences, the limitation of normative knowledge and the vari-
ability of values in a continuously changing society.65 But only by
working in limited areas, such as trade practices, can we rechart a
clearer social course, allowing for the correction of error and the
constantly changing human requirements. 66
Some of the problems and confusion in unfair trade practices are
traceable to the conflicting and inaccurate meanings given by the courts
to terms and concepts. In any survey of legal principles the words used
to give meaning to the concepts, as well as the propositions themselves,
should be studied.
Authorities agree that words are merely the symbols of objects or
abstractions. 67 Philbrick has demonstrated that words, like other
63 Oppenheim, op. cit. note 4, at 67.
64 Frank, op. cit. note 55 at 159.
65 Stone, The Myths of Planning and Laissez Faire, 18 GEo. WASH. L. Rav.
1, 45 (1949).
66 Ibid. Professor Stone correctly asserts that social action must proceed
piecemeal within fields, with allowances for mistake and adjustment to varying
human needs.
67 OGDEN AND RiCHARDS, THE MEANING OF MEANING 9 (2d ed. 1927); PHIL-
BRICK, LANGUAGE AND THE LAW 26 (1949); HAYAKAivA, LANGUAGE IN THOUGHT AND
ACTION (1949).
To denote both objects and abstract ideas the semanticists use the word
"referent."
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symbols, do not maintain a constant relationship to the objects sym-
bolized.68 Ogden and Richards explain this indefiniteness of word-
meaning by tracing the symbols back to their source. Symbols do not
arise from the inherent nature of the objects but are created by man
to communicate ideas. Between man and the object is a third factor,
thought. The object stimulates a thought in the mind of the relator
and describes it by an appellation, a word.6 9 With different relators
and settings, the words symbolizing the objects reflect the meanings
given them. In like manner, abstract words have no fixed meanings,
since they do not exist independent of the mind. The words express
the thoughts of the relator in whose mind they are in association with
other thoughts. The association process is different for each person,
although the words may have connotations for individuals.
Furthermore, Ogden and Richards' examination of the word
"meaning" reveals that there is no single course open which leads
away from our verbal difficulties. In fact, there are many routes avail-
able with varying advantages and disadvantages. Illustrative of this
confusion is the presence of sixteen reputable, yet different, definitions
and nine subordinate usages of "meaning."7 0
Words are imperfect media of communication. As Professor Chafee
observed, "A word doesn't stay put. It wabbles and slides around."7'
Confusion and obfuscation result when the same word denotes two
ideas which are closely related. Therefore, Ogden and Richards form-
ulate as an initial requirement of an adequate scheme of symbols the
proposition that a symbol should stand for only one referant.7  But,
unfortunately, this is an ideal, which in the present order of things, is
unattainable. Yet, while we are aware of the imperfection of words as
symbols, we should use them as best we can with utmost care and
accuracy.
68 Philbrick, id. at 26-27.
69 See the versatile Chafee's The Disorderly Conduct of Words, 41 COL. L. REv.
381 (1941), for an absorbing discussion on the subject.
70 Professor Chafee lists a few of these having legal application; "the words
annexed to a word in the dictionary; what the user of the word intends to be un-
derstood from it by the listener or reader (intention of the testator, etc.); that to
which the user of the word actually refers; that to which the user of the word
ought to be referring, (this is common usage, the view held by Mr. Justice Holmes,
who insists on 'the ordinary meaning of the language in the mouth of a normal
speaker situated as the party using the language was situated') - Violette v. Rice,
173 Mass. 82, 53 N.E. 144 (1889); Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12
HAuv. L. Rav. 417 (1899); that to which the interpreter believes himself to be
referring; that to which the interpreter of a word believes the user to be referring."
Chafee, id. at 387.
71 Ibid.
72 The word "referant" is used here in its technical sense. See note 67 for its
definition.
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The point has also been made that, in the hierarchial 73 nature of
words, "the more abstract the word, the greater the risk that any
proposition in which it is used will not be true of all the persons and
things within the class denoted by the word, and the more liable we
are to forget that at bottom we are talking about persons and things." 74
While verbal abstractions are less subject to precise universal
definitions, we should, nevertheless, risk the ascent to the higher
hierarchial peaks. Continuously changing social conditions require
the constant reappraisal of words to determine whether they satis-
factorily identify and communicate legal concepts. Nor would the
problem be answered if legal abstractions were eliminated in the
absence of acceptable methods for scientific verification. Words are
necessary media to express ideas and to denote variegated and related
facts. It is very important, however, that we be constantly aware of the
various meanings given legal terms in changing social environments.
In this connection, our present need is for a big spring cleaning to
see which terms in business practices embody effective and useful
principles.75
Attempts to regulate legal vocabulary, in the Hohfeldian or
Wigmoreian manner, have met with little success. Yet, it is possible to
identify the various uses of terms and "then to demand clear precision
in indicating the meaning in any particular use. ... -17 This should
be our goal - to revaluate unfair competitive terms and concepts in
the light of social requirements.
A. Fraud.
The courts have followed three different concepts as to the re-
quirement that fraudulent intent be present in unfair competition
cases. One line of authority holds that fraudulent intent is an essential
element of unfair competition. 77 Where there is an infringement of a
technical trade-mark, the intention of the infringer is immaterial
since fraud is presumed. However, this group holds that wrongful
intent is essential for relief against unfair competition because the
73 A Chafeeian symbol.
74 Chafee, op. cit. note 69, at 390.
75 Id. at 393.
76 BINGHAM, MY PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 7, 12 (1941).
77 Kellogg Toasted Corn Flake Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 235 Fed. 657 (6th Cir.
1916); D. R. Lynn Shoe Co. v. Auburn Shoe Co., 100 Me. 461, 62 At. 499 (1905);
Coca Cola Co. v. Loft, Inc. 19 Del. Ch. 292, 167 Ad. 900 (1935). See case notes 13
IND. L. J. 286 (1938) and 29 COL. L. Rrv. 44 (1929).
Also, fraud is the essence of a suit at law for damages resulting from unfair
trade practices.
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suit is founded upon the attempted deception of the public.78 This
principle applies to "passing off" or "secondary meaning" cases but
is inapplicable to some of the more modern phases of unfair com-
petition, such as the disparagement of the product of another. The
salient element of unfair competition, under this narrow doctrine, is
fraud, which is not presumed, and its existence must be established by
a clear preponderance of the evidence. 79
The second theory is a more liberal doctrine. Under it an allega-
tion of fraud is unnecessary in an unfair competition action. The
"passing off" is what constitutes unfair competition and fraud is in-
ferred from the inevitable consequences of the complained of act.8 0
Therefore, it is not necessary, in an unfair competition suit under this
doctrine, that actual fraud or wrongful intent be proved by direct
evidence. This concept is founded upon the familiar principle that "a
person is presumed to intend the ordinary results of his acts." 1 Hence,
it is not required to show that any person was actually deceived by the
conduct and led to buy the goods of the second comer in the belief
78 American Specialty Co. v. Collis Co., 235 Fed. 929 (S.D. Ia. 1916).
79 In Hughes v. West Publishing Co., 225 Ill. App. 58, 66 (Chi. 1st Dist. 1922)
the court said, "The essence of unfair competition is fraud. It consists in the sale
of the goods of one vendor for those of another, and if the defendant so conducts
its business as not to substitute its goods for those of complainant, the action
fails." See also Zangerle and Peterson Co. v. Venice Furniture Novelty Mfg. Co., 133
F. 2d 266, 56 U.S.P.Q. 351 (7th Cir. 1943).
80 Shredded Wheat Co. v. Humphrey Cornell Co., 244 Fed. 508 (D. Conn.
1917), aj'rd 250 Fed. 960 (2d Cir. 1918); Baker v. Master Printers Union of N. J.,
34 F. Supp. 808, 47 U.S.P.Q. 69 (D. N. J. 1940); National Nu Grape Co. v. Guest,
69 F. Supp. 863, 73 U.S.P.Q. 184 (E. D. Okla. 1946); Horlick's Malted Milk Corp: v.
Horlick, 40 F. Supp. 501, 51 U.S.P.Q. 269 (E. D. Wis. 1941).
81 American Products Co. Ohio v. American Products Co. Michigan, 42 F. 2d
488, 6 U.S.P.Q. 67 (E.D. Mich. 1930).
" . . . notwithstanding protestations and denials, a chancellor will not readily
believe that one entering and operating in a competitive field did so in ignorance
of the presence of competition. And if it once appears that the newcomer ap-
proached the field with knowledge of the existence of competition, under the
familiar maxim that a man is deemed to intend the natural consequences of his
acts, he is bound to know whether his own conduct will violate any established
right of his predecessors in the field. To be sure, on occasions he may plausibly
protest that the plaintiff's claim of an established identity is based, in part at least,
on associations disseminated in the public mind so indirect and subtle that he was
unaware of their existence or of their effect. But by and large, human psychology
seems to be such that the public mind in so far as it depends for a particular indenti-
fication upon indirect and subtle associations, is susceptible to confusion not
through the blunt, forthwith acts of honest competition, but rather by kindred
associations and suggestions similarly indirect and subtle. Consequently, when we
find a newcomer in the field claiming to build for himself an identity depending
upon subtle associations which in fact impinge upon those already established by
the plaintiff, protestations of innocent intent overtax the credulity." Premier-
Pabst Corp. v. Elm City Brewing Co., supra note 10.
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that they were those of the complainant. It is suffice to show that such
deception is the natural and probable result of the action.8 2
The third concept maintains that fraudulent intent is not nec-
essary and that an unfair competitive practice may exist even if it is
employed in good faith.8 3 The basis for the application of this principle
to "passing ofT' and "secondary meaning" cases is difficult to determine
since the element of probable deception must be present in such suits
and without it there can be no basis for relief. However, this doctrine
can be invoked against other unfair competitive practices, including
certain Federal Trade Commission prohibitions, where deception is
not a determining factor for relief.
It is essential that the relationship between the unfair practice
itself and the applicable theory for injunctive relief be carefully sur-
veyed and identified. Those relational factors are sufficiently uniform
in enough cases to provide the bases for a number of general norms.
Such redefinition and integration should eliminate some of the vagaries
and misapplications of theories to competitive situations.
B. Functional Features.
Functional features of unpatented or uncopyrighted articles may
be freely copied by competitors. While this proposition can be simply
stated, the determination of which features are functional frequently
presents difficulties. The classification is further complicated by the
various definitions given to those features. The significant definitions
are:
1. Functional features are those which in an engineering sense,
are essential to the construction of a commodity.8 4 All other features
are excluded under this definition.
2. Functional features are those which are commercially essential
to the production of a marketable commodity.8 5 This definition, while
82 Hartzler v. Goshen Churn & Ladder Co., 55 Ind. App. 455, 104 N.E. 34 (1914).
83 Nesne v. Sundet, 93 Minn. 299, 101 N.W. 490 (1904).
Federal Trade Commission findings as to false advertising follow this principle.
In such cases, no question of fraud exists. In fact, the courts have ruled that such
trade practices may be considered unfair even if they are employed in good faith.
Fairyfoot Products Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 80 F. 2d 684 (7th Cir. 1935);
Federal Trade Commission v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67 (1934); Federal
Trade Commission v. Balme, 23 F. 2d 615 (2d Cir. 1928).
84 Lektro-Shave Corp. v. General Shaver Corp., 92 F. 2d 435 (2d Cir. 1937);
Motor Accessories Mfg. Co. v. Marshalltown Motor, 167 Ia. 202, 149 N.W. 184
(1914). See also 3 Callmann, op. cit. note 3, at 1253 and 1266. "Functional features
are those of a technical, not an ornamental nature."
85 Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938), rehearing denied,
305 U.S. 674 (1938); U. S. Electric Mfg. Corp. v. Bright Star Battery Co., 6 N.Y.S.
2d 690 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1938). See also Nims, op. cit. note 3, at 375,
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including the above, enlarges the meaning of functional features.
3. Functional features are those which have attained consumer
acceptance and are desirable to the buyer.8 6
The process of judicial inclusion and exclusion of features, based
on these widely differing definitions, have resulted in conflicting classi-
fications of the same or similar features.
This confusion can be illustrated by reference to the design or
style of articles. When goods are purchased largely for their aesthetic
qualities, their features have been identified as functional by some
courts. Such rulings are founded on the theory that the features con-
tribute to the value and therefore "aid the performance of an object
for which the goods are intended."8 7 Hence, the contour of a bottle or
container, because of its attractive design, may be functional, although
the contents could be held equally as well in another receptacle.
Under the first definition, however, the bottle or container would be
classified as non-functional.
The general features of an electric lighting fixture have been
classified as functional,88 while the designs of an automobile lamp and
horn were held to be non-functional.8 9 Judge Learned Hand has
criticized the latter classification, contending that the design of a motor
lamp or horn may well be a factor in promoting the sale of the
article.90 When the mechanical operations of the article are the only
elements which influence the buyer's choice, then, and then only, is
the first definition conclusive. To deny the subsequent use of the
design, in Judge Hand's opinion, is an unwarranted and unsound
extension of the principle of unfair competition.
Judge Hand applied this same concept to fashion designs, which
for various reasons are unprotected under the patent or copyright
86 Ainsworth v. Gill Glass & Fixture Co., 26 F. Supp. 183 (E.D. Pa. 1988),
afrd. in 106 F. 2d 491 (3d Cir. 1939); Marvel Co., v. Pearl, 183 Fed. 160 (2d Cir.
1904); J. C. Penney Co. v. H. D. Lee Mercantile Co., 120 F. 2d 949 (8th Cir. 1941),
See also 3 REsTATEMENT ToRTs § 742. "A feature of goods is functional . . , if it
affects their purpose, action or performance, or the facility or economy of processing,
handling or using them; it is non-functional if it does not have any such effects."
Also Comment: § 742a: "A feature is non-functional if when omitted, nothing of
substantial value in the goods is lost. A feature which merely associates goods with
a particular source may be, like a trade-mark or trade name, a substantial factor in
increasing the marketability of the goods. But if that is the entire significance of
the feature, it is non-functional; for its value then lies only in the demand for goods
associated with a particular source rather than for goods of a particular design."
87 Restatement, supra.
88 Ainsworth v. Gill Glass & Fixture Co., supra, note 86.
89 Rushmore v. Saxon, 158 Fed. 499, 502 (C.C., S.D.N.Y. 1908); Lovell-McCon-
nell Mfg. Co. v. American Ever-Ready Co., 195 Fed. 981 (2d Cir. 1912).
90 Champion Spark Plug Co. v. A. R. Mosler & Co., 233 Fed. 112, 116 (D.C.,
S. D. N. Y. 1916).
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acts. In the leading case, Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp.,91 the design
on a tie was classified as functional and therefore could be copied.
There the test of the functional feature was the attractive pattern, an
important factor in the sale of the article.
Callmann attempts to distinguish between the automobile ac-
cessories cases and the Cheney decision.92 In his opinion, the ornamen-
tal accessories are not essential elements, while in the Cheney case, the
design is the essential factor. He contends that the buyer interest is in
the attractive design and not in satisfying the need for clothing. If the
buyer is not attracted to the pattern, he will not purchase the article
even if he knows that it is manufactured by a leading company. Call-
mann, therefore, concurs with the Cheney ruling but disagrees with
Judge Hand's criticism of the accessories cases.
It would seem that the difference existing between the cases is
one of degree and in no way affects the basic principle. Where the
ornamental features of an article are a factor in its sale, under the
third definition they are functional. This applies to the ornaments on
the accessory items as well as to the pattern on the tie. Nor is the
dress design the essential factor in the sale of the article. It is an
essential item along with craftsmanship and the nature of the material.
The average buyer looks for all three elements in an article.
But Callmann appears concerned that under this definition there
is no protection against the slavishly minute simulation of goods. This,
however, is another problem. The definitions of functional features
reflect the basic philosophies regarding the control of commercial
activity. They vary with the amount of competitive action permitted
at the market place. The basic issue, what measures of control should
be exercised over business, must first be resolved. Then a uniform
definition of functional features will flow from it. As it is, the various
economic philosophies of the judges find expression in the different and
conflicting judicial views as to what are functional features.
The imitation of functional features may cause confusion as to
the source when those features have acquired what the courts have
mistakenly called "secondary meaning." 93 In such cases, the courts
may require the second user to distinguish his product, but such
confusion will not be the basis for an injunction against the use of
91 85 F. 2d 279 (2d Cir. 1929). cert. denied in 281 U. S. 728 (1980).
92 3 Callman op. cit. note 3, at 1266.
93 The doctrine of secondary meaning is inapplicable where functional fea-
tures are imitated. It applies only to non-functional features. Where there is
confusion as to the source of functional features, the second user will not be
enjoined from using them as in secondary meaning cases. The confusion may be
eliminated by requiring the newcomer to add some nonessential arbitrary mark
by way of distinction.
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the functional features. 94 However, some courts have held firmly to
the principle that they should not impose a burden, either by requir-
ing a change in the appearance of the article or by adding unreason-
ably to the expense of its production and thus provide the first user
with a significant advantage and substantially handicap his com-
petitors.9 5
On the other hand, it has been held that once the right of the
second user to use the functional features is confirmed and if similarity
between the goods creates confusion, the additional cost of production
to distinguish the goods is immaterial. Under this theory, the manu-
facture is deemed a fraud and all elements of deception must be
eliminated regardless of cost if production by the second user is to be
allowed.9 6 Here, again, the wide differences in basic concepts result in
conflicting judicial action.
C. Comparison of Non-Functional Features.
The simulation of an article is " a reproduction which appears
to be substantially the same as the original." 97 If the appearance of
the whole object is substantially identical with the original, that is
sufficient to constitute copying; thus, every detail of the article need
not be reproduced. In fact, it is infrequent that the copy will be an
exact duplicate of the original. The imitator invariably introduces
enough difference to support a claim that there has been no imitation.
These differences are incorporated with enough similarities so as to
provide the general effect of the first article.98
The courts use the sight test to determine whether the copying is
sufficient to mislead the public. To determine whether there was
simulation the courts observe the differences and resemblances of the
articles. In this connection, three different tests have been applied.
94 J. C. Penny Co. v. H. D. Lee Mercantile Co., supra, note 8; Champion Spark
Plug Co. v. A, R, Mosler & Co., 233 Fed. 112 (S.D.N.Y. 1916); 1 Nims, op. cit,,
note 3, at 371; 3 RY.STATEMENT, Op. cit. note 85, at § 741 (b) (ii); Shredded Wheat Co.
v. Humphrey Cornell Co., supra, note 80.
95 Shredded Wheat Co. v. Humphrey Cornell Co., ibid.
It is very difficult to establish unfair competition when the article is simply
constructed with almost every feature being functional. See McGhee v. LeSage
& Co., Inc., 32 F. 2d 875 (9th Cir. 1929), where relief was not granted against the
simulation of a drapery hook. In A. C. Gilbert v. Shemitz, 45 F. 2d 98 (2d. Cir.
1930), the court held that the parts of a fruit juice extractor were so functional
that a change in the model would not be justified except to avoid a clear case of
confusion. See also case note in 13 IND. L. J. 286 (1938).
96 This is the view of Judge Hough as summarized by Judge Learned Hand in
Shredded Wheat Co. v. Humphrey Cornell Co., ibid.
97 3 RESTATEMENT, op. cit. note 86, at § 741, Comment c.
98 Manitowoc Malting Co., v. Milwaukee Malting Co., supra, note 12.
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One theory is that there is no simulation if the differences are more
observable to the ordinary buyer than the resemblances. 99 The se-
cond test is that simulation is not determinable by detailed descrip-
tions of the differences after careful comparison of the articles but
rather by the resemblance between them. 10 0 The third procedure
requires an examination of "the points of difference and resemblance
as a whole and not merely the points of resemblance."''1 1
Nor have there been any uniform or systematized principles for-
mulated either as to the degree of care which must be exercised by
the many buyers or the classification of the various articles purchased.
Generally, "when the resemblance between the two articles is such
that the ordinary buyer, under the ordinary conditions which prevail
in the conduct of the particular traffic to which the controversy relates,
is deceived, or might be deceived," the courts will grant relief.102 A
resemblance which would deceive an expert or a very cautious buyer,
quite understandably, is enjoinable. 103
Disagreement between the courts occurs when the resemblance
deceives only the careless or indifferent purchasers. Thus, it has been
held that deception of the casual buyer gives no right of action. 0 4
Yet, other courts have protected the casual buyer. 05 The relief, in
such cases, is founded upon the theory that "the casual buyer lives
and buys by symbols" and should be protected from the calculated
deception of a producer.O6 In many fields, the careless, credulous
99 James Heddon's Sons v. Millsite Steel and Wire Works, Inc., 128 F. 2d 6,
53 U.S.P.Q. 579 (6th Cir. 1942).
100 See the dissenting opinion of Judge Rippey in Pocket Books, Inc. v. Myers,
292 N.Y. 58, 65, 54 N.E. 2d 6, 10 (1944).
101 American Automobile Assn. v. American Automobile Owners Assn., 216
Cal. 125, 138, 13 P. 2d 707, 713, 14 U.S.P.Q. 263, 269 (1932).
102 Case note 13 IND. L. J. 286, 287 (1938); Lever Bros. v. J. Eavenson & Sons,
157 Misc. 297, 283 N.Y. Supp. 398 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. (1935); Southern Calif, Fish Co,
v. White Star Canning Co., 45 Cal. App. 426, 187 Pac. 981 (2d App. D. 1920).
"A new competitor is not held to the obligations of an insurer against
all possible confusion. He is not obligated to protect the negligent and inattentive
purchaser from confusion resulting from indifference . . . It has been said that
he is not required to make the market 'foolproof' ..... Life Savers Corp. v.
Curtis Candy Co., 182 F. 2d 4, 8, 85 U.S.P.Q. 440, 443 (7th Cir. 1950),
"... Instead, they are required only to mark or designate them in such
manner that purchasers exercising ordinary care to discover whose products they
are buying will know the truth and not become confused or mistaken." Fruit
Growers Co-operative v. M. W. Miller & Co., 170 F. 2d 834, 837, 79 U.S.P.Q. 347,
349 (7th Cir. 1948).
.03 Hill Bread Co., v. Goodrich Baking Co., 89 Ad. 863 (N. J. Ch. 1913),
104 Ibid.
109 Miller Brewing Co. v. Blatz Brewing Co., 90 U.S.P.Q. 360, 361 (Wisc. Cir.
Ct., Milwaukee City, 1951); J. C. Penney Co. v. H. D. Lee Mercantile Co., 120
F. 2d 949, 50 U.S. P.Q. 165 (8th Cir. 1941).
106 Miller Brewing Co. v. Blatz Brewing Co., supra.
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and ignorant purchasers are numerous and the viewpoint is that they
should not be confused by the simulation of an article.10 7 One court
went so far as to admit that as "a purely legalistic principle," the
law should give protection only to the reasonably prudent buyer;
nevertheless, it brushed aside the rule contending that as a matter of
common sense the casual buyer - a unit of the buying public con-
sisting of the wise and the ignorant, the indifferent and the cautious,
afid the casual and the careful - is entitled to protection from the
deceptive practices of manufacturers.1 08
The courts have not applied any systematic or consistent policy
to the varying degrees of care given to the purchase of different articles
by the ordinary buyer. Generally, the same degree of attention is
not given to the purchase of inexpensive and trifling items as is to the
more expensive and substantial commodities. There are also varying
degrees of attention given to the purchase of articles which lie be-
tween these extremes. Nor are the class of purchasers (children, ser-
vants, skilled tradesmen, etc.), the frequency of the purchases of the
product or physical location when bought considered by the courts
with any measure of consistency or by any standard. 109
Thus, to illustrate, in the purchase of milk, an inexpensive item
which is frequently bought, the degree of care of the ordinary buyer
is not great. The amount of care exercised in such purchases is fur-
ther reduced when the milk is bought in a self-service store, for there
the customer makes his purchases by general impression and uses
little care in differentiating between milk containers. 110
Further, the similarity in appearance of a medicinal tablet would
be more significant than an article of furniture. The question of
origin as to furniture is significant only as to design, materials and
craftsmanship. These elements can very largely be judged by the
purchaser through his examination of the article. In the case of the
drug, its efficiency depends on the indeterminable qualities of manu-
facture which relate to skill and integrity; therefore, the purchaser is
more concerned with the source of this product than with others." 1'
The courts have followed two conflicting rules for detecting
107 In considering the simulation of an automobile lamp, the court of appeals
for the second circuit stated, "An expert and probably a great majority of auto-
mobile purchasers could not be deceived ... but the ignorant or careless purchaser
looking to general effect, and not to what seems to him to be inconsequential de-
tails, would, very likely, be misled." Rushmore v. Badger Brass Mfg. Co., 198 Fed.
379, 380 (2d. Cir. (1912).
108 Miller Brewing Co. v. Blatz Brewing Co., supra, note 106.
109 Hi-Land Dairyman's Assn. v. Cloverleaf Dairy, 107 Utah 68, 151 P. 2d 710,
63 US.P.Q. 31 (1944); Deister Concentrator Co. v. Deister Machine Co., 63 Ind.
App. 412, 112 N.E. 906 (1916).
110 Hi-Land Dairyman's Assn. v. Cloverleaf Dairy, supra.
111 Upjohn Co. v. Win. S. Merrell Chemical Co., 269 F. 2d 209 (6th Cir. 1920).
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resemblances and differences between articles. One is the side by side
ocular comparison of the exhibits by the court. 112 Under this pro-
cedure, the objects of disputed similarity are placed side by side so
that the sizes, shapes, colors and forms may be brought into juxta-
position to determine if confusion or likelihood of confusion between
the products exists.
There is disagreement between the courts and secondary authori-
ties as to the fairness of this procedure. It has been categorically
called, "the approved test and the only way by which similitudes and
differences may be compared." 113 Nims, on the other hand, considers
this test to be obviously inadequate, "when one considers how seldom
in actual purchase of goods the buyer has the opportunity of placing
the various brands of competing goods side by side and comparing
them as carefully as does a judge in the judicial atmosphere of a
court room."1 1 4
This unrealistic approach is in contrast with the memory test.
Where a buyer has only one article before him, he can only compare
it with his memory of the other. The test of similarity, under such
circumstances, has been held to be a memory comparison and not a
visual comparison."15 Nims, in supporting the memory test, contends
that the issue is not whether there is a recognizable difference between
the articles placed side by side but whether there is a difference which
the purchaser, having no opportunity to compare the products, will
recognize." 16 However, the courts often ignore these factors and
arbitrarily apply the visual test. What is even more disturbing is that
a court on occasion, with the disputed articles before it, mistakes the
one for the other yet insists that there is insufficient confusion to
warrant relief.117
D. Secondary Meaning.
The extension of the secondary meaning doctrine to protect acti-
vities of modem origin or of fairly recent development has been met
with no little difficulty. These complications have led to strained
reasoning in the application of the doctrine to trade-names, to titles
112 American Automobile Assn. v. American Automobile Owners Assn., supra,
note 101; Avrick v. Rockmont Envelope Co., 64 F. Supp. 765, 67 U.S.P.Q. 229
(D. Colo. 1945).
113 American Automobile Assn. v. American Automobile Owners Assn., op. cit.
note 101, at 138.
114 2 Nims, op. cit. note 3, at 1019.
115 Lektro-Shave Corp. v. General Shaver Corp., 19 F. Supp. 843 (D. Conn.
1937).
116 2 Nims, supra, note 114.
117 Id. at 1020.
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of books, plays and songs and to the non-functional features of articles.
An increasingly critical view has been taken of the secondary
meaning doctrine under which relief is contingent upon a demon-
stration that the public associates the trade-name or product with its
source rather than with the goods. 11s This principle has been criti-
cized in part as being a mere fiction for the interest protected in these
cases is not in the association of the article with its origin but in its
name for which there is a created demand. 119 Judge Crane of the
New York Court of Appeals realistically argued that when "Uneeda
biscuits or Cremo cigars or talcum powder" are bought, the purchaser
does not have the producer in mind. 20 The public has little interest
in the corporate structure of the producer which may undergo many
changes unbeknown to them, yet the demand for the article through
use of the trade-name is present. The public interest or good will
in the article is keyed to the specific name given it, which, through
advertising and general acceptance, has become popular.
The difficulty of establishing secondary meaning in a complex
industrial society is recognized by the courts through the liberalization
of the rule. It is not necessary in the modem setting to demonstrate
public awareness as to the personal identity of the producer. It suf-
fices to show "that whatever is asserted to carry the secondary meaning
has come to signify origin from a single, though anonymous source."' 2 '
118 In Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., op. cit. note 85, at 118, Mr. Justice
Brandeis said, "It must be shown that the primary significance of the term in the
minds of the consuming public is not the product but the producer."
The same principle relates to non-functional features. The court, in
Sinko v. Snow-Craggs Corp., 105 F. 2d 450, 453 (7th Cir. 1939), applied it with
these words: ".... Sinko created a desire on the part of the public for one of two
things, either for knobs made by Sinko, above all other knob makers, or for knobs
made in a particular manner regardless of who made them. If it is the first situ-
ation, the law of unfair competition gives Sinko the right to monopolize or to
exclude other makers from copying the product. If it is the latter situation, Sinko
receives no such right to monopolize, even though he might have been the first
one to make the article in the particularly desirable manner."
Judge Learned Hand, in Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn & Bishop Co., 247
Fed. 299, 301 (2d Cir. 1917), said, "It is not enough to show that the wrench be-
came popular under the name 'Crescent'; the plaintiff must prove that before 1910
the public had already established the habit of buying it, not solely because they
wanted that kind of wrench, but because they also wanted a Crescent, and thought
all such wrenches were Crescents."
119 See Judge Crane's dissent in Gotham Music Service, Inc. v. Denton and
Haskins Music Pub. Co., 259 N. Y. 86, 181 N.E. 57 (1932), rehearing denied, 259
N. Y. 629, 182 N.E. 211 (1932).
120 Ibid.
121 California Apparel Creators v. Wieder of California, Inc., 162 F. 2d 893,
897, 74 U.S.P.Q. 221, 224 (2d Cir. 1947).
In the landmark case of Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn and Bishop Co.,
op. cit. note 118, at 300 Judge Learned Hand states the proposition as follows:
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This identification is made in some manner, as through a trade-name,
so that association as to source, in its original sense, is lost and mean-
ingless. The criticism here is not registered against the broadening
of the doctrine to meet current industrial requirements but in the
continuous use of old terms to mean new things. The result is not
only confusion as to the meaning of terms but also inconsistency in
the application of the doctrine.
The unwieldiness of secondary meaning as applied to the title of
a book, a play or a song is easily demonstrated. The general proposi-
tion is that an author, a playwright or a composer has no inherent
right in the title of his publication. 122 Only when the title has se-
condary meaning which identifies it in the public mind with the book,
the play or composition is the creator entitled to its exclusive use. 123
This principle is contrary to a fundamental precept of secondary
meaning, namely, the public must identify the source of origin of the
product rather than the goods if relief is to be given. In these cases,
inconsonant with secondary meaning, protection is contingent upon
identification with the product - the book, the play or the song - and
the producer's participation is not even remotely considered. The
demand is for a specific book, play or song with little or no public
interest shown in the publisher.124 Again, the ultimates recognized by
the courts are supportable; however, the measures employed conflict
with and are contradictory to the basic precepts of secondary meaning.
Questions have also been raised regarding the various methods
used to prove secondary meaning. The single factual issues in these
cases is: What is the import of the disputed word or product as it is
understood by the buyers?125 If the buyers identify the word or
product only with the kind of goods sold and do not associate it with
the source, there is no secondary meaning and a basis for relief is not
established. It would seem clear from this that the attitude of the
"... it is apparent that it is an absolute condition to any relief whatever that the
plaintiff in such cases show that the appearance of his wares has in fact come to
mean that some particular person - the plaintiff may not be individually known
- makes them, and that the public cares who does make them, and not merely
for their appearance and structure. It will not be enough only to show how
pleasing they are, because all the features of beauty or utility which commend
them to the public are by hypothesis already in the public domain."
122 Jackson v. Universal International Pictures, Inc., 36 Cal. 2d 116, 222 P. 2d
433, 87 U.S.P.Q. 131 (1950).
123 Ibid.
124 To illustrate that the demand is for the song and not the publisher see
Gotham Music Publishing Co. v. Denton & Haskins Music Pub. Co., supra, note 119.
As to a book - "demand is for the intrinsic character of the reprints
denoted by the title, the text, the popularity of the author's writing, not for the
producer." Pocket Books, Inc. v. Meyers, 292 N.Y. 58, 63, 54 N.E. 2d 6, 9 (1944).
125 Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 Fed. 505, 509 (S. D. N. Y. 1921). Sep
Annotation 150 A.L.R. 1067, 1080.
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buyers should be decisive in determining whether the first user has
successfully identified himself in the public mind with the trade-name
or product. But such has not always been the case, for courts have
held that the buyers are seldom reliable interpreters of their mental
reactions. 126 Therefore, in those cases, only slight weight has been
given to such testimony. Retailers and salesmen, who are in contact
with the public, have been judged the more reliable witnesses to in-
stances of public confusion or deception.
In determining whether the simulation of. non-functional features
of goods should be enjoined, the courts are generally faced with the
following fundamental issues:
1. Are the imitated features functional or non-functional? If they
are functional, they are within the public domain and may generally
be copied in every detail. On the other hand, if the simulated features
are non-functional, the crucial issues are (The following factors apply
also to the copying of trade-names.):
2. Did the first user establish a secondary meaning?
3. If so, did the conduct of the second user create a likelihood of
confusion as to the source? 127
The Court of Appeals in the Second Circuit in the Crescent
case' 28 articulates these precepts, which have been followed by most
courts. 1 29 Difficulty develops when the lower court fails to make a
finding of fact on the issue of secondary meaning. In the absence of
126 Premier-Pabst Corp. v. Elm City Brewing Co., 9 F. Supp. 754, 23 U.S.P.Q. 84
(D. Conn. 1934).
But see Skinner Mfg. Co. v. General Foods Sales Co., 52 F. Supp. 432
(D. C. Neb. 1943), affd 143 F. 2d 895 (8th Cir. 1944), cert. denied 323 U.S. 766 (1944)
and Steem-Electric Corp. v. Herzfeld-Phillipson Co., 118 F. 2d 122 (7th Cir. 1940),
where the testimony of consumers is given greater weight than dealers, experts
and other specialists.
127 General Time Instrument Corporation v. United States Time Corporation,
supra, note 40.
In American Fork and Hoe Co. v. Stampit Corp., supra, note 29, the
court denied an injunction in the absence of secondary meaning. It said, "In light
of this conclusion we need not consider whether the resemblance between the
appellant's and appellee's rakes is founded upon functional or non-functional
features, a branch of the case which, due to the meagerness of the record, could not
be adequately discussed." p. 476. So the court side-stepped the functional - non-
functional issue, assumed the features to be non-functional, and ruled that sec-
ondary meaning was absent. Then the court reasoned backwards from its con-
clusion and decided that a finding as to the functional or non-functional features
was unnecessary - a technique devised to overcome the deficiencies of the record.
128 Supra, note 118.
129 Grier Bros. v. Baldwin, 219 Fed. 735 (3d Cir. 1915); Bayley and Sons, Inc. v.
Braunstein Bros. Co., 246 Fed. 314 (S.D.N.Y. 1917); J. C. Penney Co. v. H. D. Lee
Mercantile Co., supra, note 105; American Enameled Products Co. v. Illinois Por-
celain Enamel Co., 123 F. 2d 631, 51 U.S.P.Q. 404 (7th Cir. 1941); American Fork
and Hoe Co. v. Stampit Corp., supra, note 29.
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a finding, the appellate courts have been known to infer no secondary
meaning. 30 Judge Frank correctly criticizes this practice. In the
General Time Instrument case, 31 Judge Frank concludes that the
court below intentionally refrained from making a finding of fact as
to secondary meaning and that the appellate court incorrectly in-
ferred the absence of secondary meaning from this lack of finding.
What is at issue here is not Judge Frank's interpretation of the vague
findings but the failure of the appellate court to insist upon special
findings as to each issue and in their absence, as Judge Charles E.
Clark suggests, call for further findings rather than final dismissal.13 2
This casualness initiates in the lower court and continues
through the appellate review. It should not matter in these cases
which present no doctrinal novelties what the judicial attitudes are
to invoking the principle of secondary meaning; yet, through the lax
treatment of the issues, the economic attitude of the judiciary assumes
fundamental portent and not infrequently is determinative of the
results.
To illustrate this lack of precision, in Miller Brewing Co. v. Blatz
Brewing Co., 133 the Wisconsin court made no finding as to secondary
meaning, limiting its consideration to the likelihood of deception.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, the most active of our com-
mercial courts, has been equally guilty of this casualness. In Swanson
Mfg. Co. v. Feinberg - Henry Mfg. Co., Inc., 3 4 the Court failed to
determine whether the features were functional or non-functional.
Meisner v. Meisner, 35 contains no findings by the New York Supreme
Court as to functional or non-functional features and secondary mean-
ing.
The Rushmore cases' 36 are cited for the minority view that the
130 General Time Instrument Corp. v. United States Time Corp., supra, note
40; Lewis v. Vendome Bags, Inc., 108 F. 2d 16, 43 U.S.P.Q. 477 (2d Cir. 1939).
131 General Time Instrument Corp. v. United States Time Corp., supra.
Judge Frank suggests that trial judges be required in all cases to publish
special findings of fact. See his article, "Short of Sickness and Death: A Study of
Moral Responsibility in Legal Criticism," 26 N.Y.U. L. REv. 545, 632 (1951).
132 Lewis v. Vendome Bags, Inc., ibid.
133 90 U.S.P.Q. 360 (Wis. Cir. Ct., Milwaukee City 1951). Also in Western
Lithograph Co. v. W. H. Brady Co., 71 F. Supp. 383, 74 U.S.P.Q. 63 (E.D. Wis.
1947), the court did not specifically consider the element of secondary meaning.
In Rymer v. Anchor Stove and Range Co., 70 F. 2d 386 (6th Cir. 1934),
evidence of confusion as to source was held to be sufficient to demonstrate the
presence of secondary meaning.
'34 147 F. 2d 500, 64 US.P.Q. 316 (1945).
135 29 N. Y. S. 2d 342, 50 U.S.P.Q. 33 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1941).
136 Rushmore v. Saxon, 154 Fed. 213 (Cir. Ct., S.D.N.Y. 1907); 158 Fed. 499
(Cir. Ct., S.D.N.Y. 1908); Rushmore v. Manhattan Screw and Stamping Works, 163
Fed. 939 (2d Cir. 1908); Rushmore v. Saxon, 170 Fed. 1021 (2d Cir. 1909); Rush-
more v. Badger Brass Mfg. Co., 198 Fed. 379 (2d Cir. 1912).
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simulation of non-functional features may be restrained without a
showing of secondary meaning "if the similarity is likely to deceive
purchasers."' 37 Yet a study of the Rushmore cases apparently re-
veals that they hold no such broad ruling. 13s The injunction in the
first Rushmore decision was based on active passing off and secondary
meaning. The second and fourth cases were decided by the secon-
dary meaning doctrine. The third decision brought elements of the
first case in line with the second and made no new findings. The
confusion as to the rulings in the Rushmore cases appears to stem
from the court's headnote to the second Rushmore decision: "One
who manufactures and sells a well-known (italics added) article of
commerce, like an automobile search light, inclosed in a shell of grace-
ful but unpatented design, may maintain a bill of injunction, profits,
and damages against a defendant who sells an automobile search light
inclosed in a similar shell, although his name appears prominently-
thereon as maker, and he has never represented that his lamps were
made by complainant, if it is shown that the similarity of the shells
does, or is likely to deceive purchasers."
The latter clause, "similarity ... is likely to deceive purchasers,"
was eagerly fallen upon by some courts to allow relief in non-function-
al feature cases without requiring the showing of secondary meaning.
However, they failed to realize that in the Rushmore case the court
was referring to "a well-known article of commerce," in other words,
one in which secondary meaning is presupposed. Thus, it would
seem, the Rushmore cases articulated no new principle. They il-
lustrate, however, what misconception may follow from the failure
of a court to enunciate in detail the crucial issues and findings in a
case.
Further support for the Rushmore doctrine is found in the dic-
tum of Enterprise Mfg. Co. v. Landers, Fraiy & Clark,'39 which with
Yale & Towne Mfg. Co. v. Alder 4 0 are cited in the second Rushmore
opinion. In the Enterprise case the court said, "There is evidence to
show that purchasers have been deceived as to the identity of these
mills, but, in the case of a Chinese copy, such as defendants offer to
the public, such proof is hardly needed." But both the Enterprise
and Yale cases "presuppose that the appearance of the article had a
secondary meaning and had been associated in the public mind with
the first comer as a manufacturer or source of supply."' 41 This is
137 2 Callmann op. cit. note 3, at 1036.
138 The writer intends to elaborate on this thesis in a future article.
139 131 Fed. 240 (2d Cir. 1904).
140 154 Fed. 37 (2d Cir. 1907).
141 This opinion is expressed in Sinko v. Snow-Craggs Corp., op. cit. note 29, at
453. For concurring views see Unique Art Mfg. Co. v. T. Cohn, Inc., 81 F. Supp,
742, 745 (E.D.N.Y. 1949) and Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilbourn & Bishop Co., op. cit.
note 118, at 300. In the latter case, Judge Learned Hand clearly stated the propo-
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certainly consistent with the holding in the second Rushmore case.
The misinterpretation of the second Rushmore decision rests
on its presupposition of secondary meaning, an assumption also
followed in the Enterprise and Yale cases. In such instances, since
secondary meaning is assumed, the element of proof of secondary
meaning - one which generally is not easy to demonstrate - is not
clearly described by the courts. While the absence of precise descrip-
tion does not modify the law so as to negate the requirement as to
secondary meaning, it may, however, substantially affect the proof of
association as to source.
Yet a "Rushmore doctrine" has been pronounced by the courts
which provides for relief from the simulation of non-functional fea-
tures without a showing of secondary meaning where the similarity
is likely to deceive or confuse buyers.142 To what extent this is an
abrogation of the requirement that secondary meaning be proved or
is the result of presupposition is not dear. If the former is the case,
how can there be confusion as to source without a secondary meaning
attaching itself to the article? This question is fundamental and has
been left unexplained by those courts which have given support to a
"Rushmore doctrine."
Nims speaks of a general rule "that it is unfair to copy the form
or shape of any physical characteristic of another's goods, if by so
doing one's own goods may be passed off as those of that other."'143
This principle was enunciated as early as 1904 in the Enterprise case
which held that "a court of equity will not allow a man to palA off
his goods as those of another, whether his misrepresentations are
made by word of mouth, or, more subtly, by simulating the collocation
of details of appearance by which the consuming public has come to
recognize the product of his competitor."' 44 Although the Enterprise
decision was based on the doctrine of secondary meaning, the above
sition: "The cases of so-called 'non-functional' unfair competition, starting with
the 'coffee mill case,' Enterprise Mfg. Co. v. Landers. . . .are only instances of the
doctrine of 'secondary' meaning. All of them presuppose that the appearance of
the article like its descriptive title in true cases of 'secondary' meaning, has become
associated in the public mind with the first comer, as manufacturer or source, and,
if a second comer imitates the article exactly, that the public will believe his goods
have come from the first, and will buy in part, at least, because of that deception."
Nor does the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, which rendered the Rushmore de-
cisions, anywhere support or give effect to the "Rushmore doctrine.';
142 Grant v. California Bench Co., 71 U.S.P.Q. 214 (Cal. D.C. of App., 2d
Dist. 1946); Hi-Land Dairyman's Assn. v. Cloverleaf Dairy, 107 Utah 68, 151 P.
2d 710, 63 U.S.P.Q. 31 (1944); Scudder Food Products, Inc. v. Ginsberg, 21 Cal. 2d
596, 134 P. 2d 255, 56 U.S.P.Q. 542 (1943). For a criticism of the majority rule as
well as the "Rushmore doctrine" see 2 Callmann, op. cit. note 3, at 1037. See also
Oppenheim op. cit. note 4, at 256 fn. 118.
143 1 Nims, op. cit. note 3, at 384.
144 Op. cit. note 139, at 241.
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quotation was modified later to form the thesis for granting relief
in simulation cases, the essence being a broadened theory of "passing
Off.' 145
It appears that the "passing off" doctrine has been used to avoid
or minimize the requirement that secondary meaning be proved.
When shorn of verbiage, its significance and effect are substantially
the same as in the "Rushmore doctrine" cases, with the attending
confusion as to whether a showing of secondary meaning is required.
In its early sense, "passing off" was in no way related to secondary
meaning, but since "passing off" has also been used to prohibit the
copying of non-functional features, that is no longer the case. The
effect has been an obfuscation of the meaning of "passing off." Is
simulation alone sufficient to constitute "passing off" or must there be
an association of the non-functional features of an article in the
buyer's mind with its producer or source?146 It would appear that
simulation alone will not support an injunction against "passing off,"
for in such cases if there is no deceit there can be no unfair competi-
tion.142' But how is deceit shown? What proof is necessary to es-
tablish the presence of deceit? These are indefinite elements which
are made more uncertain by the frequent failure of the courts to sped-
fy clearly the findings necessary to grant relief against "passing off."
Since secondary meaning is required to show deception as to source,
such findings should be precisely articulated by the courts. As a
minimum, they should provide sufficient information to support, how-
ever weakly, a presupposition of secondary meaning. Or if decep-
tion is determined by a rationale other than secondary meaning, that
reasoning should be made known.
E. Likelihood of Confusion.
Conceptual and procedural variances as to the proof required
for establishing a likelihood of confusion in secondary meaning cases
is clearly illustrated by the recent case of Chas. D. Briddell, Inc. v.
145 The early cases on unfair competition related to the verbal passing off of
one article for another. Later, "passing off" was defined to include the imitation of
non-functional features of products.
146 See Thomas Kerfoot & Co. v. Blackman & Blackman, Inc., 4 U.S.P.Q. 136
(S.D.N.Y. 1930). In this case a finding of secondary meaning was not made. Was it
established without a finding, was it presupposed or was proof of secondary mean-
ing unnecessary?
147 An action for deceit would not lie against a chain store for palming off
packaged coffee where the label of the chain store package clearly identified the
producer, although the arrangement and massing of colors on the packages of the
competing coffees were similar. Winston & Newell Co. v. Piggly Wiggly Northwest,
Inc., 221 Minn. 287, 22 N.W. 2d 11 (1946).
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Alglobe Trading Co.' 48 In his dissent to the majority holding, Judge
Charles E. Clark, with characteristic astuteness, points to the court's
contradictory conclusion that in practice there must be a showing of
actual confusion if relief is to be granted notwithstanding the govern-
ing requirement that only a likelihood of confusion need be demon-
strated.14 9 He notes that the evidence 5 0 in the case as to secondary
meaning and confusion was unchallenged and was sufficient to con-
vince the trial judge that there was a likelihood of confusion. Yet,
on its findings - a comparison of the competing cutlery and an ex-
amination of the documentary evidence - the higher court substituted
its conclusions for those of the trial court. This action by the appel-
late court was due in part to its opinion that the design of the cutlery
could not assume distinctive characteristics. If this were true, the
simulated features would be functional and could be freely copied.
However, Judge Frank, in the majority opinion, showed no desire to
conclude the argument with this principle - a common stopping
point. He continued his line of reasoning by assuming, "arguendo,"
that the design was non-functional. Then, after limiting the evidence,
he concluded that there was no likelihood of confusion in the absence
of actual confusion. And in spite of this result, he announced the
principle that in secondary meaning cases it suffices to show only a
likelihood of confusion to prevent imitation
As Judge Clark observed, this is new law - but it is not a new
practice. To obtain relief from the imitation of non-functional fea-
tures of articles, complainants generally attempt to establish con-
fusion by introducing evidence of actual deception, notwithstanding
the less formidable requirements of the law. This practice is general-
ly followed, although it is more difficult to prove actual confusion,
since the courts, quite naturally, give greater weight to such evi-
dence. 151 In fact, the unhappy experience of the plaintiff in the
Briddell case would seem to substantiate the wisdom of following
the more formidable procedure.
Further, not only have the courts held various views as to the
148 92 U.S.P.Q. 100 (2d Cir. 1952).
149 Id. at 104.
150 The evidence as to likelihood of confusion consisted of two unverified letters
addressed to the plaintiff, according to Judge Frank in the majority opinion. Judge
Clark holds this to be an error for the affidavit of a manufacturers' representative
stated "that customers, department store buyers, and others interested in plaintiff's
line were inquiring as to this 55-per-cent-cheaper product and jobbers were hold-
ing off from placing further orders. Doubtless . .. [the representative] should be
subjected to cross-examination, but his statement should not be either ignored
or limited as in the opinion. Of some importance, too, is the affidavit of the expert
pointing out in detail the several items of surface resemblance, but inner differences
of quality between the competing knives." Ibid.
151 Nims, op. cit. note 3, at 1047.
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functional features of designs, but the attitudes of some individual
judges have reflected conceptual vacillation and procedural incon-
stancy. To illustrate, in the Bridell case Judge Frank supports the
theory that the free simulation of articles is of the essence of a com-
petitive society; thus, to insure the widest range of competition, in
this case he considers the design of a knife to be within the public
domain. However, in the General Time Instrument Corp. case'0 2
he wrote a strong dissent based on the theory that the design of a
clock was non-functional, thus narrowing the concept as to competi-
tion.15 3 One might with justification inquire as to the soundness of
a conceptual philosophy of competition which is determined by the
features of articles, such as design, rather than by economic and social
forces. It is such conceptual vagaries which have created much of
the confusion and uncertainty prevailing in the law of unfair com-
petition.
JURAL RELATIONS
The difficulty in formulating consistent policies and standards
for commercial activity is due in a large measure to differences be-
tween the basic values and objectives in a competitive society. While
values and normative judgments form essential components of social
action, their validity is determined by the broadest socio-economic
concepts. Since validity under the judicial process is not infrequently
contingent upon the philosophic remonstrations and economic pre-
dilections of individual judges and not necessarily on social expres-
sion or group practice, the resulting difference in policy and opinion
are inevitable. What is required, if commercial needs are to be more
uniformly satisfied and consistently measured, is the review, the re-
formulation and the implementation of basic values and normative
judgements.
Chief Justice Stone, in evaluating the objectives of law, stated
that, "Law performs its function adequately only when it is suited
to the way of life of a people. With social change comes the im-
perative demand that law shall satisfy the needs which change has
created, and so the problem, above all others, of jurisprudence in the
modern world is the reconciliation of the demands, paradoxical and
to some extent conflicting, that law shall at once have continuity with
the past and adaptability to the present and future .... "154
152 Supra, note 127.
153 However, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in recent years has
followed a generally consistent policy as to the design of articles. See supra, note
90 and textual discussion.
154 Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HAgv. L. REv. 4, 11 (1936).
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The United States is the citadel of free competition; yet for many
years noticeable governmental encroachments have been made upon
this province. The federal government, while espousing a philosophy
of unrestrained competition, has assumed increasingly active regula-
tory authority over our economic order. These restraints on com-
petition were introduced to curb the abusive commercial practices
which were inevitable under a laissez-faire policy. Without these safe-
guards, the honest businessman would be placed at a decided com-
petitive disadvantage. Also, paradoxically, unrestrained competition
in an industrial economy results in concentrations of economic power
which are the antitheses of a free economy. Federal regulation in
the economic sphere, therefore, was necessary to effectuate the princi-
ples of free competition. 155
While it is recognized that the adequate protection and control
of economic interests come within the special province of the law,
those measures should reflect a policy of unity of purposes and an
accommodation of conflicting economic interests. However, the
inadequacy and inconsistency of legal conceptualism as to economic
matters reveal an absence of definitive standards and coherent policy
capable of reliable application. This poverty of conceptualism is
demonstrated at the legislative level by the conflict between the
copyrights law and the federal anti-trust laws, 156 and in the Federal
Trade Commission's policy of curtailment of competition under sec-
tion 2 (b) of the Robinson-Patman Act and the increase of competi-
tion under the Department of Justice's enforcement program as to
the Clayton and Sherman Acts. 157 At the judicial level the unsettled
nature of economic policy is illustrated by Judge Learned Hand's
opinions in Ely-Norris Safe Co. v. Mosler Safe Co.158 and in Cheney
Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp.159 In the Ely-Norris case, Judge Hand fol-
lowed the theory that injury rather than the means of its infliction
should be controlling. However, in the Cheney case the method of
inflicting the injury determined the basis for relief.
155 SCHWARTZ, AMER IcAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 9 (1950).
156 See White, Musical Copyrights v. The Anti-Trust Laws, 30 NEBRA. L. RIv.
50 (1950).
157 See Standard Oil Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 340 U.S. 231 (1950).
The minority in this case, while agreeing with the interpretation of the Federal
Trade Commission, admitted that that view would "weaken competition;" however,
they concluded that Congress had intended such results. See also Simon, The Case
Against the Federal Trade Commission, 19 U. oF Cm. L. Rav. 297, 316 (1952).
158 7 F. 2d 603 (2d Cir. 1925), reversed in 273 U.S. 132 (1926). This case was
decided by the United States Supreme Court in line with the theory of secondary
meaning. Subsequently, federal legislation as to false advertising was enacted.
Wheeler-Lea Amendment to the Robinson-Patman Act, 52 STAT. 111, 15 U.S.C. § 45
(1938).
159 35 F. 2d 279 (2d Cir. 1929).
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These conceptual conflicts can be explained partially by histori-
cal interpretations. Our government was founded upon precepts
which are the embodiment of natural law. Instinct and the theory of
right reason became the source for the introduction of law and for the
establishment of precedent. Through the facility of a common ton-
gue, the English cases provided suggestions for resolving local prob-
lems and controversies. Thus, the English law, with modifications to
meet domestic conditions, became a basis for social control. Inter-
stitial variants, embodying civil law, were introduced, along with
common law precepts, by Story and Kent.
The law of unfair competition did not begin to take format until
after the eighteen seventies with the coming of the era of the "robber
barons." The industrial need for stability and certainty found its
jural counterpart. Llewellyn suggests two reasons for the commer-
cial need for legal certitude during this period: The "empire builders"
required predictability and a stable law, "that means [law] ... suf-
ficiently strait-jacketed in out-moded moulds not to catch up too fast
with novel predatory practices."' 60  The dominant philosophy of
legal positivism supplied the needs through case law with minimal
legislation. It conveniently omitted rumination as to right reason,,
value judgment or ethics. It acknowledged only that law "as is" is law
and that Justice, while it may be an ideal, in practice is an accident.
Thus, the ideology of America was directed and influenced by business
interests. While this was a cold philosophy, lacking in humanitarian
concern for the hordes of immigrant labor, it implemented commer-
cial growth and formed the basis for a substantial contribution by
business to the development and the well-being of the country.
Although positivism insisted upon certitude, discordancy in
judicial law was frequently troublesome. This gave rise to the problem
of dealing with "discordant precedents," each of which created positive,
although conflicting, rules. Positivism, therefore, presented variable
rulings; those in terms of time, place or circumstances, which provided
"sound" decisions became precedent. This did not, unfortunately,
effectuate the formulation and adoption of single legal propositions
for under different settings the contrary rulings may have been ap-
plied with equal validity and effect.
Toward the end of the nineteenth century the unrest of labor, the
disaffection of farmers and the cries of small businessmen in opposi-
tion to the Trusts fomented some legal change with a re-emphasis on
value judgment. But unfair competition remained an area dominated
by jural positivism. The conflict between public and private interests,
the absence of judicial alacrity in restraining unscrupulous busi-
ness practices, the vapidity and inconsistency of precepts and the
160 Llewellyn, On Philosophy in American Law, 82 U. oF PENNA. L. REv. 205,
208 (1934).
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subjective discordancy reflected in judicial decisions were evidences of
the inability of positivism to meet the demands of an increasingly
complex society. Thus, sociological jurisprudence spearheaded the
revolt against positivism and reintroduced social ethics info private
law. In determining social values, "right" reason was again applied
with emphasis on the adjustment of conflicting social interests. Un-
systematic and desultory legislative and administrative impetuses were
applied to the control of trade practices, but a sustained and scientific
evaluation of the law was not attempted. Conflicts in case law and
trade legislation continued to mount and the advent of realistic juris-
prudence further accentuated legal discordancies.
Professor Northrup suggests the application of sociological juris-
prudence to the American society to determine both the "positive leg-
al rules" and "living law norms" just as the anthropologist Kluckhohn
applied it to the society of the Navajo Indians. He contends that
men like Kluckhohn and Sorokin have established that the "living
law norms" of a society remain indefinite and the "positive legal
rules" unintelligible unless the philosophy of the society is brought
to the forefront. In that manner sociologists like Sorokin and an-
thropoligists like Kluckhohn search out the positive law and the
fundamental living law norms of a culture to determine its philo-
sophy. This is the procedure which he recommends we apply to our
own society.
But the halls of juriprudence are open also to the other disci-
plines. In that way, through a critical synthesis, the useful features
of each theory can be employed to gain insight into the precepts and
ideals of the law. Thus, positive jurisprudence is valuable in apply-
ing logic to law. As Professor Stone has said, "The 'logical form' is
not 'fallacious' within its own proper universe of discourse. It is
only outside this universe of discourse that Holmes' 'cynical acid'
would wash the fallacy of the logical form along with the observer's
moral presuppositions from the predictions of law."'16 1 Historical juris-
prudence is useful in interpreting law according to a historical theory.
Natural law is helpful in understanding and formulating value judg-
ments. The Utilitarians provide the legislative process for improving
the administration of justice. To the extent that psychology, eco-
nomics, anthropology and other disciplines are applicable, each con-
tributes to the evaluative process.
This utilization of the significant attributes of the various jural
theories may demonstrate that the legal philosophies are not wholly
competitive but, in fact, are almost completely complementary. To
what degree it would result in a synthesis, as envisioned by Hall,102
101 STONE, THE PROVINCE AND FUNCTION OF LAw 26 (1946).
162 See his Integrative Jurisprudence in INTERPRETATIONS OF MODERN LEGAL
PMLOSOPHIES 313 (Ed. Sayre, 1947).
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and Cairns,_63 rather than an interrelation of particularistic theories
remains to be seen. Also, this procedure may mean the disappearance
of some schools as distinct branches of jurisprudence, such as may
result from the fusion of the historical school with sociological juris-
prudence. 164
There are some differences of opinion as to whether jurisprudence
can effectively operate as a social science so long as the improvement
of the administration of justice is its objective. Mr. Cairns thinks
that legal research has wrongfully forced upon jurisprudence the role
of improving the law. This he believes is a reaction to the indifference
and disdain which the bar has felt since the nineteenth century to-
wards jural theory. In the opinion of Cairns, jurisprudence should
not be restrained by the artificial limitations of legal reform in its
search for "invariant relationships among the facts." He concludes
that so long as it engages in legal technology it cannot become legal
science. 165 Since an adequate discussion of this problem would lead
us away from our main objective, the issue will not be dwelt upon here.
Each philosophic branch should have full opportunity to explore this
legal province in accordance with its own tenets.
JUDICIAL PROCESS
The law of unfair competition is desperately in need of systematic
elaboration. The method of dealing with it through "a body of
empirical rules" has proved unsatisfactory. As Professor Morris Cohen
has said, "Stare decisis means little in a changing society when for
every new case the number of possible precedents is practically un-
wieldy. Without principles as guides, the body of precedents becomes
an uncharted sea; and reliance on principles is worse than useless
unless these principles receive critical scientific attention."' 66
The philosopher John Dewey has been equally critical of the
judicial process in America. He does not believe, however, that this
means the abandonment of logic in the law. Rather, he suggests the
adoption of a logic "relative to consequences rather than to antece-
168 CAIRNs, THE THEORY OF LEGAL SCIENCE 11 (1941).
Oakeshott, The Concept of a Philosophical Jurisprudence, 3 POLTICA 202, 345
(1937-1938), recommends the superimposition on the existing schools, an extensive
"philosophical jurisprudence" operating as "supreme" critic over the others. Pro-
fessor Stone comments that "this suggestion may be of service to philosophy as such:
it seems with respect, a counsel of despair from the lawyer's viewpoint." Stone,
op. cit. note 161, at 15.
1604 Stone, op. cit. note 161, at 35.
165 Cairns, supra, at 9.
166 LAw AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 197 (1933).
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dents, a logic of prediction of probabilities rather than one of de-
duction of certainties."' 16 7
Nor does it follow that the old precepts which are operative
should be abandoned without review. Instead, the alternative is to
re-examine, revaluate and modify the principles to meet more ef-
fectively social requirements. The heritage of legal principles would
be preserved in that those rules which have prospective value would
be given continuing validity and effect. Thus, "laws on the new basis
are formulae for the prediction of the probability of an observable
occurrence. They are designations of a relation sufficiently stable to
allow of the occurrence of individualized situations - for every ob-
served phenomenon is individual - within limits of specified prob-
ability, not a probability of error, but probability of actual oc-
currence."168
Unfortunately, as our industrial order gives increasing attention
to the public interest, the courts reveal a growing inability to meet
social demands. Mr. Justice Brandeis recognized this limitation of the
judicial process almost thirty-five years ago in his famous dissent in
the International News Service case. 1 9 He admitted in his opinion
that the courts are unable "to make the investigations which should
precede a determination of the limitations which should be set upon
any property rights [in that case, in news] .... ,170 This weakness of
the judicial process is seen also in its attempt to control other activities
involving unfair trade practices. The courts are "powerless to prescribe
the detailed regulations essential to full enjoyment of the rights con-
ferred or to introduce the machinery required for enforcement of
such regulations."' 7 1
Furthermore, although the law has grown in bulk and detail the
plan of court organization has not been developed to cope with the
judicial burden of mastering the extensive materials or the detailed
intellectual discipline required by the many unrelated problems. 172
As a result, the courts, in many of the areas of litigation, have suffered
from "an indigested and indigestible mass of litigation" and rules.173
It is the increasing inability of the courts to develop and follow
167 Logical Mfethod and Law, 10 CoRN. L. Q. 17, 26 (1924).
168 DEWEY, THE QUEST FOR CERTAINTY 206 (1929).
109 International News Service v. Associated Press, supra, note 59.
170 Id. at 267.
171 Ibid. However, some writers, such as Chafee, Grismore and Callmann, con-
sider the courts not less qualified to deal with unfair competition in its broader
application than the legislatures. Chafee, supra, note 3; Grismore, Are Unfair
Methods of Competition Actionable at the Suit of a Competitor? 33 MicH. L. REv.
321, 333 (1935); Calmann, What is Unfair Competition? 28 GEo. L. J. 585, 587
(1940).
172 KocouREK, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SCIENCE oF LAW 183 (1930).
173 Id. at 184.
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a plan of systematic principles which gave fruition to legal realism and
potency to the aphorism, "There is no certainty in the law."1 74 The
effects in part were a deprecation of the law, a disrespect for order and
the fomentation of legal skepticism.
Jurists like Frank and Llewellyn, in questioning the efficacy of
legal conceptualism, freely dramatize their theories by examples of
extreme or exceptional cases. Both, however, recognize the existence
of cases which present no doctrinal novelties. 175 It is not the ordinary
but the exceptional and troublesome cases where the judge must
examine related social urgencies and demands, which create the un-
certainties in the law. As Llewellyn has observed, in such cases the
action of the judge is unpredictable. The judge may find support in the
action of a judge in an earlier case rather than from the latter's
utterances. Yet, the imaginative judge may maintain a frame of ref-
erence in the current decision which is consistant with the ratio
decidendi of the earlier case. Thus, as "every lawyer knows ... a prior
case may, at the will of the court 'stand' either for the narrowest point
to which its holding may be reduced, or for the widest formulation
that its ratio decidendi will allow."' 7 6 Therefore, in some cases, the
judge may subordinate "words to acts" and in other instances, con-
versely subserve "acts to words."
While uncertainty is an inevitable result of our complex social
system, Professor Kocourek does not find in that a justification for our
legal vagaries. Human conduct is patterned from certain drives, mani-
festations and experiences and therefore its varieties are not unlimited.
174 Professor Kocourek enumerates the evils of uncertainty of legal rules as
follows:
1. Business transactions often are hindered until the parties can ascertain what
risks of law are involved, and in what way they may be avoided. This disadvantage
manifests itself chiefly as an economic loss in the form of legal expense.
2. Litigation is encouraged in doubtful cases.
3. Transactions may be entirely impeded because of legal uncertainty.
4. Where the law is unascertainable or uncertain its moral force is weakened.
5. Uncertainty bears most heavily on those unable to bear the expense of liti-
gation. They must give way in matters of dispute because of the risk of litigation.
6. The administration of justice will lack much in uniformity where the law
is uncertain.
7. The appliers of law will be subjected more often to extra-legal influences
where uncertainty exists.
8. The appliers of law will more commonly be charged with favoritism where
uncertainty exists.
9. The government, in a condition of uncertainty of law becomes one of men
instead of a government of law.
KocouREK, AN INTRODUcTION TO SCIENCE OF LAW 178-179 (1930).
175 See Judge Frank's dissent in General Time Instrument Corp. v. United
States Time Corp., supra, note 40 and Professor Reuschlein's summary of Llewellyn's
philosophy in his JURISPRUDENCE - ITS AAsmUcAN PROPHMS 191 (1951).
176 LLEWELLYN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON SALES, Preface X (1930).
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Kocourek contends, therefore, that the trouble stems not from the bulk
of the legal data but from "the lack of conceptual tools necessary to
coordinate the historical material into legal categories."' 7 7
Since a judge cannot be a specialist in the wide range of legal
subject-matter, his principle duty is to apply the law to the contro-
versy at hand. Subordinate to the main judicial business, the disposi-
tion of litigation, is the investigation into the nature of the legal
precepts and the examination of policy. 178 In the absence of a dear
pattern of legal conceptualism, the judge, to form judgments, is com-
pelled to inquire into or make rules and policy. If standards were
more clearly framed the judge would be constrained to operate less
frequently beyond the range of judgment-making on to the shibboleth
of policy.
Another difficulty with our judicial process is-that private persons
in private suits assert only their special claims and make no attempt
to present or evaluate the social interests involved.179 It is difficult for
the judiciary by limiting consideration to individual interests to
formulate or evaluate general policy with any social vision or consis-
tency. In its broadest sense, social policy or interests should not be
guided or settled by individual fulmination but by organized and care-
ful group study.
The very bulk and diffusion of case material and the consequent
impossibility of scientific and exhaustive preceptual evaluation compel
the Bar in its court practice to depend too generally upon specific
decisions rather than upon basic principles. This over-emphasis of case
law to the detriment of concept-law has imprisoned the American Bar
so that only infrequently does it breathe the free air of conceptualism.
How common it is for an attorney to parade triumphantly before a
court the citation of a very recent decision, originating perhaps in a
remote jurisdiction and rendered by "a judge whose opinions derive
their weight solely from his official position."'s 0
The need for conceptual revaluation in various areas of the law
is recognized by realists like Judge Frank, although to them the judg-
ment and not the norm is the law. In the General Time Instrument
177 Kocourek, op. cit. note 174, at 179.
178 Id. at 186.
179 Franklin, The Historic Function of the American Law Institute: Restate-
ment as Transitional to Codification, 47 HAuv. L. REv. 1367, 1381-1382 (1934).
Professor Chafee states that "some experienced advisors consider that the main
purpose of appellate argument is to make the judges want to decide your way. It is
even said that the citation of authorities is a solemn pretext. My own view is
quite different, but here too action is the end desired - a decision for one's client -
and not merely the transmission of clear ideas." Chafee, op. cit. note 69, at 383.
180 MooRE, J. B., THE PASSION FOR UNIFORMITY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
SoM CURRENT ILLUSIONS 316, 331ff. (1924), as quoted by Yntema, The Jurisprudence
of Codification in DAvIn DUDLEY FIE.D CENTENARY ESSAYS 255 (1949).
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Corporation case, Judge Frank opines that the doctrines relating to
trade-names should "be re-evaluated in the light of competent re-
search showing their practical social consequences on consumers, and
that, until then, the courts should not extend those doctrines to foster
expanded trade-name monopolies."' 8 1 Is this not an admission by
Judge Frank that normative principles in some legal fields are deter-
minative of judgments and hence constitute the law? It would appear
so; yet, this does not repudiate Judge Frank's jural theories, since they
are representative of judicial practices for which a universalism has
not been claimed. On the contrary, the relativism of Judge Frank
reveals a flexibility of thought which is in keeping with the inconstancy
of modern society.
THE RESTATEMENT OF THE COMMON LAW
The Restatements of the American Law Institute were aimed at
the elimination of certain of the evils of the common law. Their ob-
jectives were focused on the reduction of the mass of legal publications
which had to be consulted by the Bench and Bar, on the simplification
of the common law by a clear, systematic restatement of it and on
diminishing the flow of judicial decisions. It was feared that the in-
creasing mass of unorganized judicial decisions threatened to break
down the common law system of "expressing and developing law."'' 8 2
It was conceived that the Restatements would dispel uncertainty in
the law if the law were rewritten with greater clarity and simplicity.
This, in Judge Goodrich's opinion, was accomplished as evidenced by
the number of actual volumes published, since each subject reflects as
nearly as possible currently applicable common law precepts.' 83
The Restatements have departed from the traditionalism of the
Anglo-American law for they were formulated as "an authority greater
than that now accorded to any legal treatise, an authority more nearly
on a par with that accorded the decisions of the courts.' 8 4 To give effect
to this obejctive, the courts should not have gone beyond the state-
ments in the Restatements to cite the cases which formed the basis for
their texts. The original texts should have remained the source for
the solution of each succeeding controversy. However, traditional
procedure was followed so that subsequently judicial decisions which
cited the Restatements resulted in the insulation of the public from
181 Supra, note 40.
182 Lewis, History of the American Law Institute and the First Restatement of
the Law, in RESTATEMENT IN THE COURTS, Permanent Edition 1 (1945).
183 Goodrich, The Story of the American Law Institute, 1951 WASH. L. Q.
283, 290.
184 Id. at 286.
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the texts. Thus, those decisions and not the Restatements have be-
come "the authoritative force to be obeyed."' 8 5 By continuing this
practice the purpose of the Restatements has been thwarted and the
compelling conditions which justified them have been aggrevated
instead of relieved since the Restatements function only as "an ad-
ditional source of argument."'186
Mr. Justice Stone foresaw the difficulty that "the mere restatement
of law under private auspices would not ... carry sufficient authority to
conquer the over-powering weight of precedent." 1s 7 His early proposal,
therefore, was that some method be formulated for reconciling the
doctrine of stare decisis with this cooperative legal scholarship "which
looks beyond the particular case to the law as a whole."'18 He proposed,
therefore, that state legislatures be requested to approve the Restate-
ments, not as formal legislative enactments, but as aids and guides to
the judiciary so they would be free to follow "the collective scholar-
ships and expert knowledge of our profession ....- 189
But even this mild compromise with the codification of the com-
mon law was rejected by the Institute. Perhaps it was feared that a
legislative plan would revive the nineteenth century controversy be-
tween the utilitarians and the historical jurisprudents. 190 At any rate,
while the objective of the Restatements was the clarification and im-
provement of the common law that was not to be accomplished by
codification. As Judge Goodrich reported, "I submit that our institu-
tional responsibility has been met when we have done our piece of
scholarly work, made its existence known and put it into the hands of
the bar for consideration. Out of our work and discussion which
attends and follows it will come the ideas and growth of opinion from
which changes in the law will develop. We could, if we had the means,
hasten the process in a particular instance. But in the long run, we
could tend to lose some of our authority as a source of disinterested
legal scholarship."'191
Professor Yntema in 1986 questioned the effectiveness of the Re-
statements in alleviating the evils of the common law in the absence of
legislative sanction.192 His doubt persisted, as he observed in 1949 that
185 Franklin, op. cit. note 179, at 1376.
186 ARNOLD, SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT 51 (1935).
187 Mason, Harlan Fiske Stone Assays Social Justice, 1912-1923, 99 U. oF
PENNA. L. REV. 887, 915 (1951).
188 Ibid.
189 Ibid.
190 Goodrich, Restatement and Codification, DAVID DUDLEY FIELD CENTENARY
ESSAYS 241 (1949).
191 REPORT OF ADVISOR ON PROFESSIONAL RELATIONS, AmERICAN LAW INSTITUTE,
Proceedings, 1943-1944, v. 21, p. 61.
192 Yntema, What Should the American Law Institute Do? 34 MICH. L. REV.
461 (1936).
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"the stream of materials to be consulted by the lawyer rolls on in un-
abated volumes." 193 In fact, he asked, ".... where is the reported case
that has lost its formal effect by reason of the Restatement or the case
unreported due to its existence?" And he continued, "If there be such,
and I have not heard of one, they do not affect the conclusion after a
number of years that the Restatement has not relieved the public of
the uncertainty and expense attendant upon a system of case-law.
Without formal enactment obviating the recourse in ordinary cases to
the existing decisions, it could scarcely be otherwise." 194
Another defect of the Restatements is embodied in their exclusive-
ly antecedent qualities and in the absence of prospective evaluation.
While they represent careful and scholarly historical interpretation of
legal precepts, the rules do not show critical evaluation. Nor do they
provide for the systematic development and modification of the law
since such responsibilities casually and loosely revert under the In-
stitute's program to the courts as in the past. While it is true that these
duties were not assumed by the Restatements, the omission of them
from the plans of the institute narrowly constricted its operations and
seriously limited the measures for the improvement of the administra-
tion of justice. 19 Thus, Professor Yntema characterized the Restate-
ments as digests, being merely statements of the law as it is.19 6 Since
they only report and do not attempt to reform the law their value as
media for its improvement is therefore substantially circumscribed.
It is also an error to assume that insular simplification and clari-
fication of language can adequately resolve the difficulties and problems
attending the common law. Judge Vanderbilt, in this connection, de-
cries the failure of the Restatements to use consistently a single term to
express each "fundamental legal concept." 197 Professor Stone attaches
little significance to this defect. As he said, " . . . our main juristic
problems go deeper than consistency of terminology and . . . there
193 Yntema, op. cit. note 180, at 256.
194 Ilid.
195 Mr. Justice Stone held a broader view than the Institute's as to the function
of the Restatements. In an address before the members of the Association of the
Bar of the City of New York he said, "It [the Restatement] must state in detail
and with precision accepted rules and doctrines, eliminating or modifying the rule
or doctrine not supported by reason or adopted to present-day social institutions
and needs . . . it must avoid the formal statement of the law as a dosed system,
clearly leaving open for future statements, on the basis of judicial decisions as they
are rendered, the rules governing the new and unforeseen situations with which
the law must hereafter deal as they arise." As quoted in Mason, op. cit. note 187, at
914. Note that Mr. Justice Stone gave exclusive jurisdiction over prospective law
to the courts. He omitted any reference to the legislative function in meeting
current requirements.
196 Yntema, op. cit. note 180, at 256.
197 VANDERBILT, MEN AND MEASURES IN THE LAw 34 (1949).
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is no particular virtue, either, in our misunderstanding each other in
one set of terms rather than in two or three."198 To effectuate the im-
provement of the law necessitates the application and utilization of
our entire gamut of intellectual resources, social theories and philo-
sophies. This requires that the law be viewed socially, logically, ethical-
ly, behavioristically, anthropologically, and so on. Yet Judge Vander-
bilt is correct in insisting that language be used precisely and con-
sistently, for in the absence of clear communication little progress can
be achieved in formulating plans for the improvement of law through
the integrative process.
Notwithstanding the disputed policy considerations of the In-
stitute, the Restatements represent a valuable contribution to the
improvement of the law. As Mr. Justice Cardozo observed, "The ex-
istence of this Institute is a declaration to the world that laissez-faire
in law is going or has gone the way of laissez-faire in economics."' 99
It represents a divergence from the main tradition of Anglo-American
law, assuming the historic role of providing transition from the tradi-
tional American law to a new scientific jurisprudence. 200
The Restatements were described by Professor Williston as dress
rehearsals. He said, "It has been the history of law in every other
civilized country that after customary or common law has developed
to a certain degree, or for a long period of years, and become unwieldy,
a code has followed. ... Whether it be in fifty or one hundred or two
hundred years, my own belief is that we shall repeat the history of
other countries . . . This Restatement . . . will serve as a better
foundation for a code, if one should be needed than any country has
had before." 201
Professor Yntema, while observing that the Restatements have
failed to remedy the evils of judicial precedents, is nonetheless im-
pressed by the prodigiousness and usefulness of the program. The
Restatements are "a necessary prerequisite for effective codification, or
in other words scientific improvement of the general private law in
technique, form, and substance. Also the skill and experience organized
in the American Law Institute is available to implement the grand
enterprize." 202
This applies equally as well to the sections of the Torts Restate-
ment which relate to unfair competition. It lays a foundation for the
re-examination of the precepts affecting trade practices. While the
Restatement only gathers and compiles what has been decided by the
199 Stone, Julius, Review of Vanderbilt, Men and Measures in the Law (1949)
in 24 N. Y. U. LAw Q. REV. 638, 640 (1949).
190 Quoted in Reuschlein, op. cit. note 175, at 406.
200 Franklin, op. cit. note 179, at 1369.
201 Williston, Written and Unwritten Law, 17 A.BA.J. 39, 41 (1931).
202 Yntema, op, cit, note 180, at 264.
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courts, this preliminary survey of unfair competition will be helpful
in revaluating the law.
THE CODIFICATION OF UNFAIR COMPETITION
It has been demonstrated that there is an imperative need for a
revaluation of the law of unfair competition. Also, that the judicial
process is ill-equipped to perform this function. Further, that the
Restatement, while of preliminary assistance in stating what the law
is, fails to get to the fundamental conceptual issues of trade practices.
The law of unfair competition requires more than a clarification
and simplification of language. The significant trade practices, the
economic and social considerations and the basic conceptual policies
must be reviewed and reformulated if any meaning is to be given to
the regulation of business conduct. This calls for a thorough re-
examination and revision of federal and state legislation and the
common law rules.
Then, after this study has been made and a new law of unfair
competition drafted, it should be submitted for legislative sanction as
in the case of the Uniform Commercial Code. This is consistent with
the traditions of Anglo-American law. As Judge Goodrich, succinctly
explained the practice, " . . . Common law judges and common law
lawyers are practical men. If common law rules are adequate and work,
they leave them alone. If they do not keep up, resort is had to legisla-
tion to supply the defects. The change from one to the other does not
involve a discussion of grave philosophical considerations. It is made
because it is thought necessary. It is continued so long as it produces
desirable results. This has been the method of the Anglo-American
law." 20 3
The writer recommends the preparation and adoption of a new
federal and state uniform law of unfair competition. This new act 204
would contain the essence of the law of unfair competition with modi-
fications and additions to be supplied by administrative legislation.
Obviously, current federal and state legislation affecting trade practices
and the Restatement of Torts would be helpful in the formulation of
the uniform law.
A range of unfair trade practices has been uncovered by the
Federal Trade Commission and the courts which could form the basis
for general regulatory prohibition 205 and the less effective administra-
tive decisional practice would operate only to enforce the universal
203 Goodrich, op. cit. note 190, at 250.
204 Professor Handler recommends a new uniform act to be applicable at the
federal and state levels. Handler, op. cit. note 3, at 260. In this, the writer agrees.
205 U. S. FEA.L TRADE CoiamissioN, ANNUAL REPORT 87 (1948).
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administrative rules. A practice should be prohibited only if it meets
with general business or social disfavor. Then this disapproval should
be given universal application and be controlled by forceful sanctions.
As Professor Handler observed, "Unfair competition can not be
eliminated until it is defined."' 206 The pattern of legislative, judicial
and administrative experience has been sufficiently outlined to sketch
a clear legislative picture of unfair competition but its details must be
completed by administrative action. Also, the related social sciences,
the philosophies and the other disciplines could contribute much in
formulating a consistent policy and in projecting a plan to combat
trade abuses. A law of unfair competition, which would provide
reasonable protection to both business and the public and yet not be
disruptive of American economic and legal practices, should evolve
from this integrated program.
206 Handler, op. cit. note 3, at 260.
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